Collusion, crime, and the death of downtown : a study of firm relocation in Johannesburg, South Africa by Erickson, Christina, 1977-
COLLUSION, CRIME, AND THE DEATH OF DOWNTOWN
A Study of Firm Relocation in Johannesburg, South Africa
By
Christina Erickson
MCP in International Development & Regional Planning
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, MA 02139
Submitted to the Department of Urban Studies and Planning
In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master in City Planning
at the
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY
June 2003
MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE
OF TECHNOLOGY
JUN 1 8 2003
LIBRARIES
© 2003 Christina Erickson. All Rights Reserved
The ulhwtorobewwN to Mi
prrnisson to seprodue on dto
dktbut pubicy paper and
elecvonic copies of this thesis
documnent In whole or In part
Author
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
May, 2003
Certified by
Professor Diane E. Davis
Associate Professor of Political Sociology
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
Thesis Supervisor
Certified by_
Professor Langley Keyes
Chair, MCP Committee
Department of Urban Studies and Planning
ROTCH

Abstract
This study explores the dynamics of firm relocation in Johannesburg, South Africa, by analyzing
the mass exodus of firms out of the city's Central Business District (CBD) over the past two
decades. Using a historical approach, this study examines the interplay between urban form
and firm behavior. We typically understand urban form to be a function of firm behavior-that is,firms choose their locations and thus dictate which areas are developed. This study finds that
the inverse is true. Firm behavior is a function of urban form. Firms are location-takers. Forces
endogenous to the urban form act on firms to determine which areas of a city are favorable for
firm location. The following chapters probe the way changes in the Johannesburg CBD's form,itself a function of political, economic, and social transition, push individual firms to disperse to
new locales throughout the city. Exogenous factors like crime, state failure, and skewed
property markets biased firms against the CBD as a viable location. Their predominance in the
range of factors that affect firm behavior suggests that a focus on extra-firm institutions (rather
than the firms themselves) more adequately explains the relationship between firm behavior and
urban forms.
Figure 1.1: Skyline of the Johannesburg CBD in the background; rubbish heap in the foreground.
Source: Author's photo, taken in January, 2003.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
This study explores the dynamics of firm relocation in Johannesburg, South Africa, by analyzing
the mass exodus of firms out of the city's Central Business District (CBD) over the past two
decades. Using a historical approach, this study examines the interplay between urban form
and firm behavior. We typically understand urban form to be a function of firm behavior. That
is, firms choose their locations and consequently dictate which areas are developed. This study
finds that the inverse is true. Firm behavior is a function of urban form. Firms are location-
takers. Forces endogenous to the urban form act on firms to determine which areas of a city
are favorable for firm location. The following chapters probe the way changes in the
Johannesburg CBD's form, itself a function of political, economic, and social transition, push
individual firms to disperse to new locales throughout the city. The collective movement of
these firms has dramatically altered the economic landscape of the city-potentially to the
detriment of those living in the Southern areas of the city in the former townships.
Background
Driving through the CBD in Johannesburg today is not for the faint of heart. The guidebooks
warn, "After the shops close, the city center becomes a virtual ghost town and extremely unsafe
unless you're in a car... Don't head into the center to discover 'the real South Africa' until you
have well and truly sussed the place out," (Lonely Planet, 2002).
The streets in the area (which cover a large area-about 150 square blocks) are filled
with high-rise office buildings, a handful of government buildings, and retail centers. Little more
than ten years ago, the CBD was the thriving center of business activity. It was pristinely
maintained and tightly policed under the stern gaze of the apartheid state.
Now, many of the high-rise offices are vacant. Some have been invaded by squatters,
transforming offices into overcrowded apartments. One modern skyscraper in the heart of the
commercial district has chains on its doors, (see Figure 1.3). The once prestigious, now vacant
Carlton Hotel protects itself from squatters-or any visitors-by hiding behind a black metal
fence, (see Figure 1.4). The thriving formal business hub has been replaced by thriving
informal businesses. During the day, vendors and hawkers crowd the sidewalks. Minibus taxis
tear through the city streets. At night, these streets are deserted, save for the estimated 4,500
homeless people, (Interview C, 6 Jan 03)'. The shopping centers continue to operate, but are
permeated with crime. (On my first visit to the Carlton Centre-the CBD's renowned shopping
mall-I witnessed a police chase with drawn guns inside the mall.)
The change in the CBD represents a microcosm of a larger process of transition in
South Africa. What is perhaps interesting about the CBD's transformation is that (in addition to
nearby inner city areas) it is arguably the only area in Johannesburg to have witnessed real
demographic change since South Africa's transition to inclusive democracy in 1994. The city's
settlement and economic patterns remain divided along starkly racial lines. Though many claim
that racism has become secondary to class conflict in Johannesburg (Beall et al., 2002;
Tomlinson et al., 2003, etc.), the built environment continues to hamper the city's efforts to
integrate their historically segregated residents. Why has demographic change been limited to
the inner city?
Inner city communities like the CBD, Hillbrow, and Berea, are distinct for two reasons.
Their geographic position in the center of the city makes them a symbolic link between the
wealthy white North with the poor, black South, (see figure 1.5-map of racial distribution of
Joburg). The density of the built environment in these areas (the only high-density
development in the entire city) means that there are necessarily more congested sidewalks,
1 All names of interviewees have been omitted to protect the confidentiality of the interviews. A list of their
positions, organizations, and dates of interviews are included at the end of the Sources section.
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street life, and human interaction. Perhaps partially due to their geography, they became sites
of protest, struggle, and testing of anti-apartheid sentiment during the 1970s and 1980s.
Figure 1.3: Photo of a vacant CBD office
tower-now with chains on its doors
Source: Author's photograph, taken in
January, 2003
Figure 1.4: Photo of Carlton Hotel, CBD
Source: Author's photograph, taken in January, 2003
Figure 1.5: Map of Racial Distribution in Johannesburg
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How did changes in the CBD affect businesses? During this period, the central business
district was transformed into a multi-racial, politically-charged microcosm of the nation's
conversation (and contestation) over citizenship, redistribution, and racial imbalances. A quick
drive through the CBD vividly illustrates the reaction of business to this external climate in the
CBD. Formal businesses left the CBD en masse during the period around transition. The aims
of this project were to understand (a) to what degree they left-and during which periods; (b)
where they went; and, most importantly, (c) why they left. Though political transitions often
create periods of instability and insecurity, this need not be manifest in spatial transformation of
the type that occurred in Johannesburg. This study attempts to unpack the underlying dynamics
that motivated firm behavior during South Africa's transition, and to understand how these
behaviors in turn disrupt and alter the urban form.
The Evolution of a Research Question
My experience in Johannesburg coincided with a research project I have been involved in that
studies some of the new theory on firm location patterns. New growth theories, popularized by
people like Paul Krugman and Michael Porter, assert that firms in the "new economy" are likely
to display clustering patterns. These theories assume that for firms to survive in an increasingly
competitive environment, they must continually innovate-both in their processes and products.
To improve their innovation potential, firms gravitate towards one another. They may cluster in
order to tap both tacit and codified (often proprietary) knowledge, (i.e., to take advantage of
spillovers). They may cluster with consumers or suppliers, in the hope that their proximity and
close exchange will induce better product and process innovations.
In reading through many of these theories, it struck me that they share an assumption-
or an approach-that innovation and/or production possibilities drive location. This, however,
did not seem to be the case in Johannesburg. Anecdotal evidence and firm surveys suggested
(in the early phase of my research) that crime, not production possibilities, pushed firms to
relocate out of the CBD.
Crime as a "push" factor is rarely cited in the literature on space, innovation, and
regional-location strategies. Instead, theorists focus on economic factors like proximity to
users/suppliers, potential for knowledge spillovers, access to markets, currency stability, etc.
How might a non-economic push factor affect the clustering patterns of firms? It seemed
plausible that crime might drive firms to cluster in unexpected ways. Perhaps firms would
cluster to take advantage of security spillovers (i.e., existing strong security infrastructure with
effective public and private police forces). Perhaps they would cluster in patterns that follow the
residential movement away from the inner city. Perhaps they would use the opportunity of
relocation to move closer to similar companies (horizontal networks) or to suppliers and
consumers (vertical networks). Perhaps they would not display clustering patterns at all.
My question, in comparing the Johannesburg context with the theoretical literature on
clustering, was whether there was something unique about crime as a push factor that might
promote new forms of clustering and innovation. Pushed out by crime, would firms be pulled in
directions that we would not expect?
These were the questions I had in mind when I set off for Johannesburg in January
2003. What I quickly realized upon arrival was that my query rested on a fundamental
assumption: that crime pushed firms out of the CBD. The more interviews I conducted, the
more I came to understand that crime, while an important factor, is certainly not the only factor.
To argue that crime alone pushed these firms out would be inaccurate. Instead, interviewees
cited a whole host of drivers of firm relocation: not enough parking; high taxes; traffic
congestion; technologically obsolete buildings; political protests; and racism.
I struggled with how to categorize these disparate answers, and how to analyze them
critically to determine which were legitimate concerns and which were just proxies for politically
incorrect motivations. This type of analysis is always difficult given the degree of interpretation
that goes into each retelling of history. How could I discern which factors mattered in pushing
firms out of one area and into another?
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Rather than trying to fit these factors into some sort of hierarchy, I devised a framework
that is broad enough to encompass many of them, but hopefully direct enough to be of some
use to those concerned with how to manage or prevent intra-urban firm relocation.
Framework: What really makes firms relocate where they do?
Firm relocation = f (e, s, p, g)
Where: e = economic stability
s = security
g = government
p = proximities
Economic stability refers to the macro-economic environment. It takes into account inflation,
exchange rates, growth rates and general economic performance. Security refers to the degree
of real and perceived crime, violence, and civil unrest within a firm's immediate area or
neighborhood. Government refers to the degree to which governments (local or national)
effectively manage cities and neighborhoods (i.e., through taxation, policing, street
maintenance, legislation against truant landlords, bylaws controlling street trading). Proximities
refer to the synergies or benefits accruing to a firm that locates in close proximity to other firms.
These synergies could include knowledge spillovers, infrastructure- or resource-sharing, or
access to a customer base.2
Situating these four factors within a push-pull framework, as is common in relocation
theory:
2 I have deliberately excluded transport costs from this framework. In doing so, I do not mean to ignore its
relevance to firm location. Traditional location theories analyze firm behavior through the lens of direct
forces on the firm, like the costs of labor, transport, and materials. This study instead focuses on the
exogenous factors that indirectly affect firm behavior by changing the urban form. Though direct costs
are obviously critical to a firm's decision, I argue that they are secondary to (indeed, defined by) the
underlying political, economic and social climate. I believe that a historical analysis of these exogenous
factors more adequately helps make the link between both firm behavior, to which traditional location
theories are limited, and urban form.
PUSH
Economic instability
/nsecure surroundings
Firm relocation = f Poor government oversight
Weak gains from proximities
PULL
Economic stability
Secure surroundings
Firm relocation = f Strong government oversight
Strong gains from proximities
I argue that firms that opt to leave a certain location are pushed out by some combination of
economic instability, insecure surroundings, poor government oversight, and weak gains from
proximities to other firms. These same firms are pulled towards new locations that offer some
combination of the converse forces: economic stability, secure surroundings, strong
government oversight, and strong gains from proximities. I contend that this conception of firm
location better incorporates the role of exogenous, non-economic factors into the firm decision-
making model than existing theories.3
Applying the Framework
This framework provides room for each of the push and pull factors my interviews and research
cited as drivers of firm relocations in Johannesburg. Rather than isolating each of these factors
and explaining how they fit into such a framework, I offer a more broad application of the
framework. I present each of the four forces that act on firm relocation decisions in the form of
four separate (though related) chapters. In my research, I found these forces to be central and
somewhat under-reported drivers of firm relocations in Johannesburg. By laying out their
dynamics, I can draw insights for application to other contexts.
3 A review of these theories begins on p. 21.
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The first force is that of proximities. I argue in Chapter 2 that the benefits of proximity
(for which I use agglomeration as a proxy) were not strong enough in the Johannesburg CBD to
outweigh the exogenous pressures on firms in that area (business flight, crisis of confidence,
civil unrest, crime, and racism). These firms were not necessarily pushed out by poor
synergies. Rather, these synergies-weak or strong-were overshadowed by other factors. In
Chapter 2, I map the flight of business from one location to another. I show that firms (a) did not
follow their neighbors in the CBD to new locales; and (b) did not relocate near other same-
sector firms, at least not near those also previously located in the CBD. This does not
necessarily refute the notion that proximities matter, or that firms cluster. Rather, it suggests
that firms prefer one of the other 'pull' factors (secure surroundings, better service provision,
etc.).
The second force is economic stability-or, in the case of South Africa during
transition-economic instability. Chapter 3 tells a story of economic instability through the lens
of a volatile property market and its effect on land development and sale in Johannesburg. In
this chapter, I argue that major South African institutions over-invested in property in the
northern suburbs of Johannesburg during the early 1980s. They relied on optimistic
assumptions about economic growth that never materialized in Johannesburg. To render these
investments profitable, they therefore had to offer their property to firms at below-market rates to
existing firms in the city. This provided a considerable pull to firms in the CBD (where
confidence was beginning to shake). This perspective on property developers' manipulation of
land markets offers new insights into the external dynamics that dictate the internal decision of
the firm to relocate.
The third force is secure (or insecure) surroundings. I discuss this force in Chapter 4,
where I return to my original hypothesis that crime drove firms out of the CBD. I acknowledge
that insecurity felt by CBD firms during this period was rooted in a much broader set of
concerns, from racism to fear of civil unrest. I note that crime did not become a problem in the
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CBD until the 1990s. However, I focus on crime because, in talking with firms themselves, I
found it repeated again and again as the principal factor pushing the firm out of the CBD.
Moreover, during the 1990s, crime rates were comparatively higher in the CBD than elsewhere.
In this chapter, I discuss firms' perspectives on crime, studies that document the effect of crime
on business location, and the relative crime rates throughout the city. I note the challenge firms
face in making location decisions when crime is universally high throughout the city. I argue
that fear, rather than crime itself, underpins firm flight out of the CBD-and this fear is somehow
exacerbated by the physicality of the CBD. Finally, I suggest that crime tends to be used more
as a rhetorical tool for conveying a collective sensibility about "the city" than a reflection of a
higher incidence of crime.
The fourth and final force is government. In Chapter 5, I argue that national and local
government conflicts both led to a deteriorated physical environment in the CBD and provided
incentives for moves to the northern suburbs. I demonstrate the way institutions and laws affect
firms' attitudes towards certain locations. I ground these arguments in the historically tenuous
relationship between local and national government in Johannesburg and its direct impact on
city management and governance.
Finally, I conclude with thoughts on how intra-urban firm relocation affects employment,
transportation, and equitable opportunities. In a city that is already famously segregated, the
decentralization of economic activity decidedly away from the inner city, (which is the major
transport destination from the poorer, southern areas of the city) is worrisome. I offer some
suggestions for the future of the CBD, and some thoughts on the promotion of 'growth nodes' by
the city's economic planners. I argue that understanding the complex set of exogenous factors
that underpin firm location decisions is key not only for understanding the past, but also for
predicting future patterns of growth.
As Pellenbarg et al. (2002) note, the decision to relocate is a conditional one. It removes
the site being abandoned from the spectrum of locations considered for relocation. When firms
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do this on a massive scale, we witness the collapse of certain spaces in the urban environment.
The Johannesburg CBD is one of these spaces. This thesis is as much about understanding
firm behavior as it is about understanding the process of urban spaces falling in and out of
favor.
Methodology
This study required answering four questions: (1) Didfirms relocate out of the inner city? (2)
Where did they go? (3) Why did they leave? (4) Why did they choose this new location?
First, I gathered data on the current locations of 1034 firms that were located in the CBD
in either 1986 or 1996.4 These data provide firm-level information about (a) where in the CBD
firms were located; (b) which firms left and which firms stayed; and (c) where in the city they
relocated. By using a phone book to gather this information, I excluded the firms that relocated
out of the Johannesburg area-and confined this to an intra-urban study.
Second, I conducted a phone and e-mail survey of a sample (n=1 6) of the 1034 firms.5
In my survey, I contextualize the mapping exercise by asking firms why they left and why they
relocated where they did. I ask questions about their property ownership (both in the CBD and
in current locations) to determine whether firms follow property owners, or more organic market
forces. I also ask questions about the degree to which crime affected their decision.
Third, I conducted roughly 45 interviews with local policy makers, city officials,
redevelopment authorities, NGOs, academics, police officials, realtors, and citizens. These
interviews provided a rich background to the city politics, dynamics of transition out of apartheid,
and economic change.
Finally, I augmented this primary research with readings in South African history and
politics, and Johannesburg historical and empirical research.
4 For a description of how I collected the data, see Appendix A.
5 For a description of the how I conducted the survey, see Appendix B.
This was the methodology I used to understand the Johannesburg case, specifically. To
situate this research within a broader context, I focused on location and relocation theories-
with an eye towards the new theories of economic geography and clustering. Both because of
their simultaneous emergence and the popularity (globally and locally) of the latter, the
Johannesburg firm exodus out of the CBD and new economic geography writings seem like
good bases for comparison.
Literature Review
Because there is surprisingly little work on understanding the role of the firm in a particular
urban space, I focus this literature review on firm behavior and urban form. I look first at the two
literatures broadly. Then I focus on their institutional determinants, to compare the existing
literature with the framework I have proposed. I contend that this study adds to the existing
literature by providing a framework for merging the analyses of firm behavior and urban form.
The literature on firm location and firm relocation attempts to explain the determinants of
firm behavior. Their explanations typically point to endogenous drives to expand production or
innovate. Location theory starts from the perspective that economic activity occurs within a
physical space-and that this space matters. Location theory tends to be dominated by a focus
on agglomeration economies, transportation costs, and minimizing productive factor costs.
Neo-classical location theory centers on transport costs and the benefits of
agglomeration for industries and firms. According to Alfred Weber's theory of the location of
industries (1929), analysts expect industries to locate where transportation costs of raw
materials and final products are minimized. Marshall's theory of agglomeration (1920) suggests
that firms will locate close to one another to reap the benefits of spillovers, shared resources,
and economies of scope (Polenske, 2002c). These theories fail to describe why Johannesburg
firms might reject the benefits of agglomeration, spillovers, economies of scope and low
transport costs by choosing decentralized locations.
Central place theorists similarly fall short, (e.g., by positing that transport costs drive firm
location. Assuming a featureless plane, the theorists suggest that there is a positive price-
distance relationship. As firms move further from the plant, the transport costs rise, leading to
the emergence of a dominant "central place." These central places grow when either production
costs fall or there is a change in transport costs (Polenske, 2002a) Johannesburg firms'
behavior-that is, the mass movement to decentralized, remote locations-suggests that
transport costs are not prioritized.
Product Life Cycle theorists assert that as products mature, both sales and optimal
production locations change (Polenske, 2002a). Were this theory explanatory of the
Johannesburg CBD relocations, it would mean that each (productive) firm was experiencing
product maturity.
Storper and Walker's (1989) alternative location theory more adequately speaks to
exogenous factors driving firm location. They assert that:
1. Industries have locational freedom from the past.
2. Growth and dynamism pull new industries away from established centers.
3. Regional resources come from "rounds of investment."
Although their theory is attractive because it incorporates history, industrial power, and firm
dynamism, Storper and Walker's theory falls short because it deals only with innovative firms'
location strategies. My research deals almost entirely with non-innovating firms. Additionally,
they tend to gloss over the differences between industry and firm.
In the following chapters, my research should demonstrate first that firms do not enjoy
locational freedom from the past. In fact, the past plays a significant role in determining their
future location. Second, growth and dynamism are not the primary drivers of firm flight away
from the established center. Rather, political change, developer pressures, and crime leave
firms assuming that their survival (not necessarily growth) depends on relocation.
An extension of location theory, relocation theory emphasizes the role of history and
conditionality in firm location decisions. From the outset, it is important to highlight the lack of
research on urban-level firm location, and intra-metropolitan firm relocation. The available
theories tend to focus on (a) regional, national and global levels; (b) industrial rather than firm
location; and (c) productive rather than commercial or retail economic activity.
Pellenbarg, van Wissen and van Dijk give a comprehensive overview of the theoretical
and empirical research in relocation theory. Distinguishing firm relocation theory from location
theory, they note,
Firm relocation differs from firm location because it explicitly takes account of the
fact that one location is substituted for another. The firm has a history, and this
history is likely to have an influence on the locational outcome of the process.
This locational outcome is therefore a conditional one. The specific nature of
these conditional effects is important for any theory of firm relocation (2002: 3).
They go on to argue that these conditional effects can be interpreted as push and pull forces.
Their emphasis on history and context (through a framework of push and pull factors) provides a
key model for the structure and approach of this thesis.
Pellenbarg et al. summarize some of the key contributors to relocation theory. The
movement of American industry from north to south inspired early theories of firm relocation
(Garwood 1953; Mueller, 1961). During the 1960s and 1970s, the field came to be dominated
by British-based theorists (Luttrell 1962; Cameron and Clark 1966; Keeble 1968; Townroe
1972). In Britain during this period, the central government heavily intervened to try to prevent
the demise of former manufacturing centers. They used location control, capital subsidies and
labor subsidies in an attempt to push manufacturing industry into key areas (Pellenbarg et al.,
2002: 13). Because the British interventions were more rigorous than those of United States
government, attention and empirical work naturally focused on the United Kingdom. All of these
studies assume a much larger geographical scale than the city, so are marred by certain
theoretical barriers for my purposes.
Intra-urban relocation theory is understudied, and therefore fairly underdeveloped.
Empirical studies of intra-metropolitan relocations are typically undertaken by private firms,
doing independent, contract work. As a result, there is not much rigorous attention paid to how
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these studies fit into a larger theoretical and empirical picture of urban economic growth. As
Pellenbarg et al. (2002: 34) lament,
Another topic that needs more attention is the study of firm mobility on the local
scale. On the one hand, the lack of interest in research for the local scale is
understandable because of the smaller impact of local moves on employment
structures. On the other hand, the relative ignorance of the local moves is to be
pitied, because from them a lot can be learned about the basic causes of firm
relocation, and the course of the inherent decision process. In almost all cases,
firms consider a local move before eventually deciding upon a move over greater
distances, so it is very much worthwhile to know more about this phase.
Furthermore, firm relocations over short distances can be very important in order
to facilitate adjustment processes in the local economy.
One of the few intra-urban relocation studies I unearthed was conducted in 1980 by Erickson
and Wasylenko. They developed a model of firm relocation, and they tested it with empirical
evidence from intra-metropolitan relocation in Milwaukee. Their model is limited to pullfactors
like agglomeration economies, proximity to labor, available land, and proximity to transport.
Wasylenko (1980) went a step further in acknowledging the need to look both at "demand for
sites by firms and the supply of sites by communities, using the tax rate as an equilibrating
mechanism." By exploring demand, he acknowledges the presence of not just pull, but push,
factors in relocation.
The figures that these studies provide on the percentage of firms that have relocated
best illustrate the extraordinary character of the Johannesburg case. Erickson and Wasylenko
found that only 4.2% of Milwaukee firms relocated between 1964 and 1974. Pellenbarg et al.
found that between 1994 and 1995, 7.9% of all firms in the Netherlands relocated. In
Johannesburg, up to 85.2% of firms relocated out of the inner city, (see complete data in
Chapter 2). These figures are staggeringly different. They suggest that there is something far
more important than economic restructuring and suburban dreaming occurring in Johannesburg.
The applicable work on urban form attempts to explain the decay of inner cities and
the rise of the suburbs. It mirrors some of Beauregard's characterizations of urban decay in
the United States. Indeed, the images he presents are remarkably evocative of the
Johannesburg city decline. "Population loss; the physical deterioration of housing, factories,
and shops; the collapse of urban land values; rising city property taxes and soaring crime rates;
deepening poverty and unemployment; and the growing concentration of minorities have all, at
one time or another, been dominant themes (Beauregard, 2003:3). My approach rejects the
notion that post-Fordist production (a move away from centralized manufacturing) prompted the
dissolution of downtowns and the proliferation of suburban development. Although
Johannesburg did experience declining manufacturing employment and consequent spatial
tendencies to decentralize, this change was minimal. Secondary sector employment only
dropped by 4% between 1980 and 1991, (see Table 1.1).
Table 1.1: Employment by sector in the Johannesburg Metropolitan Area, 1980 and 1991
Primary sector Secondary sector Tertiary sector
1980 1991 1980 1991 1980 1991
No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %
21,227 2.8 17,101 2.3 225,742 30 189,560 26 509,978 67 523,726 72
Source: Beavon, 1997.
Johannesburg's decentralization is more complicated. Though some of the mechanisms may
be the same in the United States and South African cases (conflicted politics delaying inner city
service provision, over-speculation in suburban land markets, etc.), the specific political and
economic contextual differences render a comparison difficult.
Just as Beauregard writes on the flight from cities, there is a wide body of literature on
the emergence of the suburb as a destination for business. The decline of the inner city is often
linked in a chicken-and-egg argument to the rise of the suburb. A nod to urban history
acknowledges that the centrifugal forces promoted and prompted by suburban development
have been with us for the past 300 years. Robert Fishman traces the emergence of suburbs to
the London bourgeoisie of the late eighteenth century, who sought refuge for a new form of
family-the 'closed, domesticated, nuclear family' (Fishman, 1987:5).
Decentralizing trends are not new. However, they are changing their form. Even
Fishman (1987:16-17) notes,
... The suburb since 1945 has lost its traditional meaning and function as a
satellite of the central city. Where peripheral communities had once excluded
industry and large-scale commerce, the suburb now becomes the heartland of
the most rapidly expanding elements of the late twentieth century
economy... (These) perimeter cities are functionally independent of the urban
core.
The causes implicit within these centrifugal forces are changing in time with changes in
capitalist exchange. Suburban development in Johannesburg has a unique history. As early as
1890, the powerful mining magnates built sprawling residential estates to the north of the
mines-in the area now comprising the northern suburbs (Beavon, 2000). These early settlers
planted a thick forest of trees. Notably, Johannesburg is considered to have the largest urban
forest in the world. Yet the natural terrain of the city is dusty savannah. This difference is
striking to observe. The wealthy (historically white) areas of the city are starkly distinguished
from the poorer (historically non-white) areas of the city by the mere presence of trees.
Johannesburg's suburbs continued to expand through the 2 0 th century. "Even so, the
large central business district located just north of the mining-land continued to be the single
most important meeting point for people of all races although its opulence was reserved for
whites only" (Beavon, 2000). In reading property documents and policy pieces from the early
1980s (Mandy, 1984; "New Perspectives on Urbanisation," 1986; Prinsloo, 1982), there is a
sense that decentralization and a strong CBD could (and did) co-exist. The exodus from the
CBD is thus arguably more than a sudden preference for suburban business.
Finally, I want to discuss the new theories on economic geography and clustering, not
least because these theories partially motivated this study. They are interesting in this context
because they share an approach that combines urban form with firm behavior. However, they
do it in a slightly different way than I intend to. They share the assumption that firm behavior
influences urban form. They assume that firms locate to expand their own productivity, (Porter,
2001; Krugman, 1991; Storper and Walker, 1989; Morgan, 1997). They do not consider that the
relationship might work inversely: that urban form might exert more of an influence on firm
behavior. In this study, I propose that this is exactly what occurs in Johannesburg. I maintain
that firms in Johannesburg were location-takers. This is to argue that the location of economic
activity in Johannesburg is based more on exogenous factors-factors that shape the urban
form-rather than on the economic activity itself.
Johannesburg demonstrates an extreme case of firm relocation and an extreme case of
inner city decline. In unpacking the dynamics of this case, I attempt to shed light on the
multitude of alternative explanations-economic and non-economic-for why firms relocated.
Specifically, I argue that property markets, insecurity, and the state were central determinants of
Johannesburg's urban form and, by extension, firm behavior.
One problem with urban form driving market decidons is that it skews the range of
choices for firms. It creates a heterogeneous landscape in which capitalism will have
unpredictable or potentially inefficient outcomes. I do not intend to argue that this is a problem
in itself. But it suggests that to understand firm behavior, economic activity, and the potential for
economic development (in this case, on specific neighborhood-level planes), one must
understand the urban form against which the activity occurs.
As this thesis demonstrates, urban form's effect on firm behavior tends to dictate the
extent of economic activity (read: job creation) in specific areas of a city. In Chapters 3 to 5, I
look historically (from 1980-2000) at developments in the CBD to determine ways that firms and
form relate to and impact one another. Buried in this history are some interesting insights into
the mechanisms and institutions that failed to create stable environments for doing business.
Identifying these helps us move beyond generalizing about firm relocation and points to specific
points of plausible intervention.
Why should we care?
First, such a study fills several gaps in the existing literature. There is a paucity of work that
incorporates exogenous factors into theories on clustering, new growth, and economic
geography. I know of no attempts to map (on a micro-level) the spatial movement of firms out of
the Johannesburg CBD.
The new discourse of economic geography pays surprisingly little attention to urban
economic growth. The existing work on learning regions, knowledge-based growth, and
building competitive advantage focuses on developing export clusters, and globally recognized
clusters of innovation. Despite lip service paid to the importance of space and geography, there
is little study of the dynamics of economic activity at the level of the city. As a result, this
literature tends to ignore some of the more mundane issues of managing and "growing" the
existing firms in an economy. The vast majority of these firms are small-medium enterprises
that provide services for local consumption. Their movement may not trigger large growth rates
directly, but they are responsible for the vast majority of jobs in a city.
When these "local" firms move-even to a new locale in the same urban area-they can
wreak havoc on the local economy. Especially in a decentralized city with poor public-transport
linkages, the movement of these firms can severely limit the employment opportunities of those
in the deserted area. When these firms move en masse-as in the near total decentralization
from the Johannesburg CBD-there are serious local impacts on employment. Even if jobs are
not shed, disposable incomes of those having to commute further fall. For those who live in the
region, suburb, or neighborhood that was abandoned by the firms, employment opportunities
are pushed even further out of reach.
On the flip side, understanding why firms locate where they do can give policy makers
insights on how to promote certain areas or regions-and how to cope with spatially equitable
regional growth. From a planning and economic development perspective, city managers need
to know what they are up against in recruiting firms to invest. If, indeed, not all firms make
decisions based on security, perhaps these firms need to be identified. City managers and
planners may need to rethink their targeting strategies. If high-valued added service industries
tend to locate along the urban fringe, but low-value added sectors will locate closer to the urban
core, perhaps officials in the city of Johannesburg should redirect some of their attention
towards attracting the latter type of firms.
Conclusion
Because the stability of the local economy relies first on the stability of its localized firms, I
contend that firm relocation, when present in extreme forms, can undermine a city's overall
growth potential. That is, the location theorists' (which speak to the development of export-
oriented, productive industries and firms) predictions of firm location become untenable in a city
skewed by firm relocations. I maintain that the massive firm relocations to decentralized areas
(almost wholly in the North of the city) stand in the way of sustained economic growth in the city
because they create a rift in the economic geography of the city. It is therefore difficult-if not
impossible-to consider (as policy makers have been trying to do since the new South Africa's
inception in 1994) popular location theories like 'clustering' as having any real impact in South
Africa.
On the other hand, perhaps the doomsday perspective is overstated. Schumpeter
looked at the workings of capitalism, and duly noted that the defining feature of capitalism is that
it sustains itself through "creative destruction." Like capital, cities and spaces within cities
undergo creative destruction. Indeed, it is the mark of what Morgan describes as a "learning
region" to be able to respond to such economic downturn with creative institutions, incentives,
and retraining policies, (Morgan, 1997). Extended to cities, Schumpeter's theory of creative
destruction implies that areas within cities have the potential to develop new modes of growth.
The demise of these areas marks only one phase in their long-term development.
The problem, for planners, of course, is the immediacy of the short-term: the recognition
that real people live in these economically abandoned areas. These real people hold a
legitimate right to share in the city's wealth. Developing ways of reintegrating them into the local
economy thus becomes critical. The policy implications (and some suggestions for a way
forward) are made in the conclusion.
To jump ahead a bit, perhaps there are some lessons to be learned from the current
literature on firm location. If the localized industries appear unusually footloose-or unwilling to
locate in certain areas of the city-perhaps one solution would be to return to the
recommendations put forth by location theory. That is, to exploit some of the competitive
advantages of the abandoned areas (low rental costs, low transport costs, close proximity to
low-income labor) to recruit new types of industries in these areas. Encouraging economic base
industries to locate here would likely create agglomeration economies-thereby bringing back
(or creating new) localized firms in the abandoned areas, and thereby opening up employment
opportunities.
This seems quite logical-and perhaps we would expect local economic planners to
consider such ideas. However, to read Johannesburg's economic plans and to speak with their
planners and local officials, it is clear that they remain committed to the growth of high value-
added, knowledge intensive sectors (i.e., financial and business services). Though I will discuss
and critique this stance at length in later chapters, it bears mentioning now that their
commitment to these sectors indicates the internationally persuasive power of Porter's theories
of competitive advantage and Krugman's theories of a new economic geography.
This seems to be a broader problem of globalization writ large. These discourses get
written (typically on the bases of empirical observations in the industrialized countries), held up
as "truth" by major institutions like the World Bank and U.S. universities, and picked up by policy
makers the world over.
My micro-analysis of firm movements in Johannesburg attempts to critique this blind
acceptance by pointing out the mismatch in conditions on the ground with the assumptions of
these theories. First, I argue that the primary problem in Johannesburg at present is the
increasingly polarized economic geography of the city. Describing global-cities (noteworthy for
it is Johannesburg's claimed goal [Joburg 2030, 2003; CDE, 2003]), Susan Fainstein notes,
To the extent that they contribute to a spatial mismatch that reinforces labor-
market exclusion, global-city characteristics may then be an indirect cause of
income inequality...Those global cities whose fortunes are particularly tied to
financial markets are supersensitive to swings in those markets, with the
consequence of serious instability in the livelihoods of their residents. Although
globalization is not the direct cause of polarization in Tokyo, its connection to the
speculative frenzy of the 1980s and subsequent bursting of the bubble makes it
an indirect determinant.
These conditions are echoed in Johannesburg. The location of the vast majority of economic
opportunity in the northern suburbs (in tandem with very poor transport links) precludes the vast
majority of the city's citizens, who are overwhelmingly poor and Black, or, in the South African
understated but polite jargon "formerly disadvantaged," from accessing employment. This
polarization arguably fuels the high crime rates, exacerbates the incidence of disease, and
creates overall instability, which acts as a further deterrent to attracting economic investment-
and to sustaining the investment that already exists in the city.
The global prevalence of speculative capital and its effect on property markets have
been at the heart of the Johannesburg firm exodus. In the next chapter, I describe at length
how an asymmetrical property market in Johannesburg (fueled by speculative capital) played a
direct role in motivating firms to relocate out of the CBD.
My argument, in short, is that firm relocation matters. It matters why these firms left
because many of the forces pushing firms out of the CBD over the past 20 years (property
speculation, crime and grime, racism) continue to exist. It matters where these firms went
because it highlights the polarization of opportunity that their relocation has created. It will be
difficult for Johannesburg as a city to achieve meaningful economic growth (or equitable
economic growth-rhetorically the primary goal of the ANC) if they continue to understate the
importance of not just what happened to the CBD (i.e., how can we revitalize the inner city), but
answering the question of where firms relocated, and how access to these new nodes can be
improved.

Chapter 2: The Data
Mapping the flight of business out of the CBD
In this chapter, I map the movement of firms over the last 20 years from the Johannesburg CBD
to the city's northern suburbs. I gathered address-level data on the current locations of 1034
firms that were located in the CBD in either 1986 or 1996. These data provide firm-level
information about (a) where in the CBD firms were located; (b) which firms left and which firms
stayed; (c) where in the city they relocated. In using a phone book to gather this information, I
excluded any firms that relocated out of the Johannesburg area-and confined this to an intra-
urban study.
The following pages highlight my findings on the past two decades of firm flight out of the
Johannesburg inner city. I attempt to answer the questions: Did firms relocate? Which firms
relocated? Where did they go? The chapter begins with on overview of the raw numbers of
firms that relocated out of two districts within the CBD, over two time periods (1986 and 1996).
Next, I map the movements of firms from the CBD to other sites within the city. Finally, I look at
a specific building in the CBD (the Carlton Centre) and chart the movements of its tenants. I
disaggregate the Carlton Centre's firms into various sectors to determine the degree to which
firms (a) clustered in the Carlton Centre, and (b) follow similar clustering patterns in their new
locations. Throughout this chapter, I emphasize the apparent preference of firms to choose
decentralized locales over agglomerations. I use the data in this chapter as a springboard for
arguing that strong exogenous forces in Johannesburg pushed firms into decentralizing in a
more extreme way than we might observe in other post-industrial cities.
First.. .did firms leave the CBD?
The following statistics and charts offer compelling evidence that yes, firms left the CBD.
1 collected data for two neighborhoods (Commercial and Financial districts) during two periods.
The Commercial District of the CBD comprises the highlighted area on the Eastern side of the
map (see Figure 2.1). This area has witnessed one of the most dramatic downturns in the CBD.
Flanked by the prestigious Carlton Centre and Hotel, the Commercial District was the premiere
shopping area in South Africa through the 1970s. Through the 1990s, its property values
crashed. The Financial District comprises the area on the Western side of the map, (see Figure
2.1). This area has also undergone a turbulent period through South Africa's political transition.
However, it is now one of the key districts in the city being revived. The "Financial" District is a
bit of a misnomer now-the area, encompassing the cultural precinct of Newtown-is being
marketed as the cultural hub of the city.
Commercial District in 1986
According to the 1986 Braby's Directory, there were 2463 firms in Commercial District buildings.
I looked each of these firms in the 2003 Johannesburg phone directory. Of these 2463 firms,
539 of them still exist and have address listings in the city. This indicates a surprisingly high
21.9% recovery rate. That is, 21.9% of the firms that were located in the Commercial District in
1986, (a) still exist; and (b) are still in Johannesburg.
Of these 539 firms, only 47 firms (or 8.7%) were still in their Commercial District
locations. The remaining 492 firms (or 91.3%) relocated-most of them (85.2%) to areas
outside the CBD.
6 For a detailed description on how I compiled this data, see Appendix A.
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Financial District in 1986
The Financial District witnessed a similar exodus. According to the 1986 Braby's Directory,
there were 712 firms in Financial District buildings. According to the 2003 phone directory, 149
of them had addresses in Johannesburg (a 21.2% recovery rate). Of these 149 firms, only 14
(or 9.4%) of the firms stayed in their Financial District buildings. Some relocated within the CBD
(13 firms, or 8.7%), but most (121 firms, or 81.2%) left the CBD altogether.
Figure 2.3
1986: % of firms that relocated
(Financial District)
l Stayed
N Relocated
Commercial + Financial Districts in 1996
For 1996, I aggregated the Commercial and Financial districts, since there were fewer firms in
both districts by this time. This fall in businesses reported by Braby's Directory was an
indication in itself of the rising vacancy rates in the CBD. Their listing of 776 firms between both
districts in 1996 demonstrates a 68.5% decline in the number of firms in the CBD since 1986.
These figures are especially telling because they account for new businesses coming into the
area. These numbers suggest that 68.5% of the office space that was occupied in 1986 was
vacant by 1996.
Of the 776 firms listed in the 1996 Braby's Directory, I found current addresses for 346 of
them, (a 44.6% recovery rate). My recovery rate rises noticeably for 1996, since less time has
elapsed and the likelihood of survival for a 1996 firm is higher than for a 1986 firm.
Of the 346 firms I analyzed, 95 (or 27.5%) of them stayed in their current locations, and
a total of 121 firms (35%) stayed in the CBD. Again, this figure is much higher than the
retention rates of 1986 firms. I would argue that it is the more resilient firms that are still located
in the CBD in 1996 (given rising crime rates and deteriorated perceptions of the area). So it is
unsurprising that more of them (though notably only about 1/3) opt to stay in their current
locations. The remaining two thirds (346 firms or 65%) left the CBD altogether.
Figure 2.4 1996: %of firms that relocated
(Financial + Commercial Districts)
5/
N Stayed
0 Relocated
NO 5
Clearly the real push out of the CBD occurred in the 1980s, with a total of 580 firms
leaving the CBD during this period. However, the 65% flight rate, (an exodus of 346 firms)
witnessed in the 1990s is also significant.
Carlton Centre: 1996
Finally, to examine one particular building within the Commercial district, I looked at the firm
relocations of the Carlton Centre in 1996. Their results mirror those of the aggregated 1996
analysis above. I found that of 82 total firms in the Carlton in 1996, 56 (or 68%) of them left the
CBD altogether.
Figure 2.5
1996: % of firms that relocated
(Carlton Centre)
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Where did they go?
We know that firms left the CBD in massive numbers. Where did they go? The following
figures map the flight of business from each neighborhood, and in each period.
As Figure 2.6 shows, firms that were located in the Commercial District in 1986
decentralized throughout the city, though predominantly to the north. A few key hubs can be
identified in Houghton, Parktown, Rosebank, and Sandton (also called Sandown). Forty-five
firms are now located in Sandton. This is perhaps unsurprising, as many consider Sandton to
Figure 2.6: Map of the relocations of 1986 firms (Commercial District)
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2003.
be the new CBD, (Interview E, 2003; Interview F, 2003; Interview 0, 2003). However, it is
important to remember the total number of firms that this map represents. I found current
addresses for 539 firms in this category. So the "hub" in Sandton only corresponds to 8% of the
total. Additionally, there are a large number of suburbs that contain only 1-3 firms. This
indicates that firms are dispersing to a significant degree.
Figure 2.7 maps the movement of firms that were located in the Financial District in
1986. This map looks fairly similar to the pattern of Commercial District firms. The top four
destinations for these firms are Rosebank, Braamfontein, Illovo, and Parktown. Again,
Rosebank, with 10 firms, represents only 7% of the 149 firms mapped in total. The bulk of the
firms locate in dispersed manners-most often with only one or two firms per suburb.
Do the results change by 1996? Figure 2.8 shows that in fact, the patterns remain
remarkably similar. With about 32 firms, the new CBD (Sandton) captures only 9% of the total
number of firms. The other 'hubs' during this period are comparably small-with Braamfontein
and Rosebank only hosting about 10 firms each, (3% of the total). It would seem that firms are
dispersing even more than in earlier periods.
Similar Findings Elsewhere
My findings are echoed by existing research. Rogerson and Tomlinson report that, "Between
1982 and 1994, 17 of the top 65 corporations relocated their head office from the CBD to one of
the business nodes in the northern suburbs," (Rogerson & Tomlinson, cited in Beall et al., 2002:
55). The CDE report similarly finds that:
By April 2001 almost 500 of the city's 600 advocates had left Innes Chambers in
Pritchard Street, directly opposite the Supreme Court, and moved to Maisels or
Garden Chambers in Sandton. More were due to leave the CBD when their
leases expired. The bar secretariat itself moved to Sandton after its lease
expired in March 2002. It seemed the advocates would rather travel 15 or 20 km
twice a day (and be near many of their clients) than remain in the city centre,
where they could walk to court across the road, (CDE, 2002: 38).
Though these findings are unlikely to surprise anyone in Johannesburg, this study fills a gap in
available literature on the decline of the city's CBD by following on a broader scale the
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Figure 2.8: Map of the relocations of 1996 firms (Commercial + Financial Districts)
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movement of firms from the CBD to new locations within the city. Newspaper articles and
existing studies tend to chart only the movements of leader firms. They tend, as a result, to
assume that the smaller firms are indeed "following the leaders." My results suggest otherwise.
Firms-especially small firms-tend to disperse widely throughout the city.
To better understand firm behavior, I isolated a single building in the CBD-the Carlton
Centre-and tracked the movement of its tenants over the two time periods. The Carlton
Centre is one of the largest office buildings in the CBD. At 50-storeys high, it boasts that it is
"the tallest building in Africa." Beyond its size, the Carlton Centre is steeped in symbolic
meaning for the city. For the past thirty years, it has been both an economic anchor for the
commercial district, and a cultural image of both apartheid-era nostalgia and the political
struggle against apartheid. The first legal non-racial restaurant in South Africa was established
in the once 5-star Carlton Hotel in 1975 (CDE, 2002: 22). Many people used the Carlton
Centre's demise as a barometer for the general downfall of the CBD.
The Carlton symbolized the CBD's boom in the 1960s and 1970s... However,
changing dynamics in the inner city steadily undermined the complex until, in
1997, Anglo American Property Services (Ampros) put it up for sale... Ampros
wanted R84 million-roughly what it had cost to build the centre almost three
decades earlier. In August 1999, the transport parastatal Transnet bought the
entire complex for a mere R32 million-according to the Financial Mail, 'less than
one tenth of its replacement cost and not much more per square meter than the
cost of the carpets in the.. .off ice of Saki Macozoma, (then) Transnet's CEO
(CDE, 2002).
That the Carlton experienced such utter decline makes the study of its tenants especially
interesting.
In disaggregating the Carlton Centre, I test the hypothesis that firms that "clustered" in
1996 and 1986 (i.e., were all located in one building), would also "cluster" when they moved to
new locations. If they co-located originally to tap synergies or knowledge spillovers, then
shouldn't they also co-locate after crime has pushed them out of the original location?
To test this hypothesis, I first identified the sectors of firms located in the Carlton Centre in 1996.
They are as follows:
Carlton Centre Sectors in 1996
Tourism
6%
Personnel
6%
1.
E Architects
* Art/Crafts/Music
o Association
EJ Auto
* Chemicals
" Computing
* Engineering
l Finance
* Food
* Government
0 Import/Export
* Legal
* Local services
* Manufacturing
* Medical
M Natural resources
M Personnel
O Printing/Publishing
" Property
o Retail
M Tourism
M Transport
The four primary sectors in 1996 were retail (31 firms), legal (13 firms), tourism (5 firms), and
personnel (5 firms). Where did these firms go? Below, I analyze the movements of legal and
retail firms from the Carlton Centre to new locales.
Figure 2.9
LEGAL
Table 2.1 shows the current addresses of the legal sector firms that were located in the Carlton
Centre in 1996. If firms clustered in their new locations, we would expect to see them all
locating in the same suburb. As the figures and charts below demonstrate, these firms did not
cluster in their new locations.
Table 2.1: Legal firms located in the Carlton Centre in 1996
Brugmans Inc Carlton Centre Carlton Centre Same(CBD)
De Vries Inc Carlton Centre Carlton Centre Same(CBD)
Sibiya Attorneys Carlton Centre CBD Merbrooke House,
Commissioner Street
Smith, Mervyn J Carlton Centre CBD 14 Nugget St., City & Suburban
Krawitz Michael & Co Carlton Centre Dunkeld West 25 Bompas Road, Dunkeld West
Jansen-Potter Attorneys Carlton Centre Kensington The Lion House, 20 Roberts
Ave.
Snyman HJG Carlton Centre Northcliff 282 Pendoring Road
Rubenstein GB Attorney Carlton Centre Parktown 11 Rock Ridge Road
Mayat Nurick & Associates Carlton Centre Parktown North 62 7th Avenue, Parktown North
Melamed & Huruwitz Inc Carlton Centre Riviera 70 Oxford Road, Riviera
Fluxman Rabinowitz Raphaely Carlton Centre Rosebank Baker Square, 33 Baker St.
Perlman S Carlton Centre Rosebank Alliance House, Rosebank
Praetor Trust Carlton Centre Rosebank Nedbank Gardens, Bath Ave.
Of the legal firms "clustered" in the Carlton Centre in 1996, two of them stayed in the Carlton
Centre. Two of them relocated to other space in the CBD. The remaining nine relocated,
(69%). Did these law firms stay together?
No. They remaining nine all moved to northern suburbs, but do not display clustering
patterns. Three went to Rosebank, where they stayed in close proximity-but not in the same
building or even on the same street.
RETAIL
Table 2.2: Retail firms located in the Carlton Centre in 1996
Hilmond Weavers & Carlton Centre Auckland Park 55t Sandhurst, Auckland Par
Interiors
3rd Base Clothing A Carlton Centre Bedfordview Eastgate Shopping Centre, B
Manny's Keyhole Carlton Centre Bramley Bramley Shopping Center, 28
Denim King CC Carlton Centre Bruma Lake Bruma Flea Market, East Opp
Levisons Stores (Pty) Ltd Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Sterns Jewellers (Pty) Ltd Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Wimpy Restaurant Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Carlton Bakery Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Carlton Centre Florist Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Galaxy Jewellers Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Gift Inn Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
La Panache Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Love Inn Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Pumpernickel Restaurant Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Springbok Panorama Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Truworths Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Clicks Stores Carlton Centre Carlton Centre (CBD) Same
Alex Hair International Carlton Centre CBD Small Street Mall, The Brid
Tigers Eye Retail Carlton Centre CBD 35 Phillips St., City & Sub
Curry Tavern The Carlton Centre City Deep City Deep Market, City Deep
Camera Kiosk Carlton Centre Dunkeld West 281 Jan Smuts Ave, Dunkeld
Roxy's Restaurant Carlton Centre Melville 20 Main Road, Melville
Frames Unlimited Carlton Centre Parktown 31 Prince Wales Terrace, Pa
Private Collection Carlton Centre Rivonia 40 Rivonia Blvd, Rivonia
Boutique Bazaar Carlton Centre Sandton Village Walk, Maude Street,
Lane Hair Clinic Carlton Centre Sandton 124 Daisy St, Sandown
Gold Coin Exchange Carlton Centre Sandton Twin Towers, Sandton City
SA Diamond Dealers Carlton Centre Sandton Sandton
The South African Gold Carlton Centre Sandton Twin Towers West, Sandton C
Coin
Toty's Restaurant Carlton Centre The Gardens 48 The Avenue, The Gardens
Ladine Beauty Centre Carlton Centre Weinberg 34a 6th Ave, Weinberg
Hilmond Weavers & Carlton Centre Auckland Park 55t Sandhurst, Auckland Park
Interiors
The first noticeable difference here is that a large proportion of retail firms stayed in the Carlton
Centre. Thirteen firms (42%) of the retail firms stayed in the Carlton Centre, and two firms
relocated to elsewhere in the CBD (6%). Did the remaining 52% of retail firms cluster in their
new locations?
There appears to be some pull towards Sandton, with five firms (16%) relocating there.
Two of these firms (Gold Coin Exchange and The South African Gold Coin) relocated to the
same shopping centre: Twin Towers, Sandton City. Their movement perhaps demonstrates
some micro-level clustering.
However, the majority of firms relocated to decentralized places-not even necessarily
in shopping centers. This indicates that the market in South Africa is changing through this
period. Consumers of these retail goods and services are more willing to travel (read: drive) to
dispersed locations. Do we see the same patterns in 1986? (See Figure 2.10.)
Again, retail and legal sectors figure prominently in the Carlton Centre. The financial
sector also has a noticeable presence in 1986. Out of 95 firms (for which I found current
addresses), 15 were in the retail sector; 11 were in the financial sector; and 10 were in the legal
sector. Did these firms stay together through their relocations?
Carlton Centre Sectors in 1986
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RETAIL
Table 2.3: Retail firms located in the Carlton Centre in 1986
Fim 98 Addes 200 Suur 200 Stee Addes
Hippe Furs (Pty) Ltd Carlton Centre Birdhaven 17 Wingfield Ave, Birdha
Lloyds Travel Carlton Centre Bryanston Bryanston, S Center, Hob
Cuthberts Carlton Centre Carlton Centre Same
Amica Boutique Carlton Centre CBD 4 Smal Street Mall
Dodo's Boutique Carlton Centre CBD Saambou National Bldg, C
Circus Carlton Centre Highlands North Balfour Park S Center, H
Trouser House Carlton Centre Hillbrow High Point, Koetze St.,
Stubihl Curios (Pty) L Carlton Centre Parkwood 15 Torquay Rd, Parkwood
Lilliputs Toys Carlton Centre Rosebank The Mall, Craddock Ave.
Golden Sheepskin, The Carlton Centre Rosebank The Zone, Rosebank
Wesleys Tobacconist Carlton Centre Rosebank The Mall, Craddock Ave.,
Biji Boutique Carlton Centre Rosebank Regents Place, Cradock A
Hitachi Ltd Carlton Centre Rosebank Nedbank Gardens, Bath Av
Forma Viva Fine Jewell Carlton Centre Rivonia 116 Medical Mws, Rivonia
Sharp Edge Sharp Shoot Carlton Centre Sandown Li 5C Sandton City, Sando
Retail firms that were located in the CBD in 1986 appear to have clustered slightly more than in
the later period. Rosebank was a popular destination for firms-likely because of its large
shopping mall (The Zone and The Mall are connected). However, the remaining 66% of firms
tended to disperse-predominantly to northern suburbs.
LEGAL
Table 2.4: Legal firms located in the Carlton Centre in 1986
Fr196Adrs 200 Suur 203 Stee Addes
Louis Gishen and Assoc Carlton Centre Bryanston 58 Peter Place
Mervyn J Smith Carlton Centre CBD 14 Nugget St.
Oshry David & Associat Carlton Centre Dunkeld West Albury Road
Krawitz Michael & Co Carlton Centre Dunkeld West 25 Bompas Road
Venter GC Oden Carlton Centre Glenvista 16 Cunningham Road
Lourens and DeLange At Carlton Centre Northcliff 156 DF Malan Ave
Lowndes Group Carlton Centre Parktown Nedbank Park
Fluxman Rabinowitz Rap Carlton Centre Rosebank Baker Square
Melman and McCarthy Carlton Centre Rouxville 38 Boundary Rd
loulianou S Attorney Carlton Centre Senderwood 13 Chaucer Ave
Legal firms that were located in the Carlton Centre in 1986 are now located in very dispersed
patterns. Only one law firm stayed in the CBD (Mervyn J Smith). The others have relocated
entirely to the northern suburbs. This implies that either they were not clustered together to
enjoy spillover effects from similar firms in the first place, or that these spillover effects were not
valuable enough to maintain them. An interesting follow-up study would examine the areas
where these firms relocated. Are there other law firms nearby? For now, we can only assume
that these particular firms did not share enough of a relationship to maintain it through their
relocation.
FINANCE
Table 2.5: Financial firms located in the Carlton Centre in 1986
Firm 1986 Address 2003 Suburb 2003 Street Address
Dolomite Investment Carlton Centre Bryanston
Centaur Finance Carlton Centre Chislehurston Trade House
Gorfil Brothers Invest Carlton Centre Dunkeld West 20 Kent Road
Kleinwort Benson Ltd Carlton Centre Dunkeld West 2 North Road
Spectrum Financial Con Carlton Centre Kensington Milner Road
Randoux Finance (Pty) Carlton Centre Parktown JCC House
Bayerische Vereinsbank Carlton Centre Parktown 3 Rockridge Road.
Intercontinental Finance Carlton Centre Sandhurst 19 Woodside Ave
Grosvenor Asset Manage Carlton Centre Sandton 20 Fredman Drive
Bank of Tokyo Carlton Centre Sandton The Forum
Credit Commercial Carlton Centre Sandton Nedcor Bldg
Finally, we turn to the financial sector. Tellingly, none of the finance-related firms stayed in the
CBD. They all moved to the northern suburbs. Three firms (27%) moved to Sandton. Two
firms each (18%) moved to Dunkeld West and Parktown. Again, we see the same patterns:
some micro-level clustering, but for the most part decentralized dispersal of firms that once
shared the same building.
Suggestions for future research
The address level data I have collected on firm movements out of the CBD can be used for
many supporting analyses. Though such analyses would be somewhat outside the scope of
this paper, they would be useful in drawing out some of the correlations (or lack thereof)
between past and future firm locations. Do certain types of firms (i.e., by sector), demonstrate a
preference for certain areas? Do firms that were located in the same building, or in the same
immediate vicinity tend to follow each other to new locations? These questions could all be
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answered through further analyses of my data. I posed these questions for a single building,
the Carlton Centre. But it would provide a rich comparison to add several other buildings (or all
buildings) to the analysis.
Moreover, additional data collection would augment the information I have here. As
mentioned earlier, it would be helpful to collect more data on the areas where firms relocate, to
determine firms' relationships to other firms in the new area. Did firms relocate to tap the
benefits of proximity to their new neighbors? Did they tend to locate near "leader" firms?
It would be useful, too, to have more detailed information on the firms in my dataset. How many
employees did/do these firms have? What are their specific locational determinants (i.e.,
proximity to customers, proximity to suppliers, access to transportation for goods or employees,
etc.)? I attempted to texturize my own data set with these types of questions in an informal
phone survey. But the cost of phoning many firms internationally, and the time it takes to
interview even one firm prohibited me from conducting a comprehensive survey. With some
more time and resources, such information could provide more valuable, precise insights into
firm behavior in Johannesburg.
Conclusions
What can we conclude from these analyses? By and large, firms in the same sector do not
follow each other from one location to another. Regardless of what pushes these firms out of
the CBD, they are unlikely to cluster in the same way that they did prior to relocation. Do these
findings debunk cluster theory?
It is difficult to disregard cluster theory entirely without more information about the areas
to which firms relocated. However, cluster theory is clearly inadequate for explaining why firms
relocated where they did.
Additionally, in making sense of the demise of the CBD, we need to ask why firms
disregarded the "benefits" that typically accrue from agglomerations. Why did firms opt for
decentralized locations over their locations in an urban core with a full range of amenities and
close proximity to similar firms?
Agglomeration and clustering forces, which the literature claims motivates firm location,
were not strong enough to keep firms in the inner city. What were the exogenous forces that
must have acted on these firms? In the next three chapters, I argue that three exogenous
factors (property markets, crime, and state failure) pushed firms to such an extent that they
gave up their benefits of agglomeration, and opted for decentralized locations. These factors
push firms out of cluster formations.
Why weren't these same firms pu/led together in more centralized patterns? Although
we do witness the emergence of a few commercial hubs in the northern suburbs (as in
Rosebank, Sandton and Parktown), firms tend to locate in highly dispersed configurations.
In reading through the next three chapters on the impact of exogenous factors on firm behavior,
it is important to keep in mind this question of why firms forfeit agglomeration economies in
favor of their dispersed locations. The following chapters should offer enough evidence to
explain why firms make this tradeoff. In the concluding chapter, I will consider the potential
setbacks of choosing decentralized patterns of location over agglomerations (or clusters).
There are setbacks not only for firms themselves, but for the society at large. It is important to
emphasize that agglomeration is, in fact, traded off for decentralization. This is not a story of
firm location, but firm relocation. Since growth in the South African economy remains marginal
throughout the 20-year period studied here, it is not new firms that are choosing dispersed
locations (as in Silicon Valley, for example). Rather, it is existing firms that are leaving their
"clustered" locations for decentralized sites.
We turn now to the first reason I put forth for why Johannesburg firms made this choice:
the role of property markets.

Chapter 3: Manufacturing Clusters
The role of property developers in pushing firms out of the CBD
"There is nothing unique about the Johannesburg context, in terms of property tendencies."
-Interview J, Urban Economist, Interviewed 10 Jan 03.
In this chapter, I take issue with this economist's claim. I contend that Johannesburg's
decentralization was unprecedented in its rapidity, its scope, and its intra-urban nature. If,
according to my data, an extraordinary 85.2% of firms located in the CBD in 1986 subsequently
relocated 7-and not to other countries or regions, but within the same city-is it fair to suggest
that Johannesburg's property tendencies are no different than elsewhere in the world?
Just as the property tendencies diverge from what we would expect to see, so do the
property market's actors. Throughout this chapter, I point to the agency of property developers
in encouraging relocations out of the CBD. In so doing, I make two arguments: (1) property
developers in Johannesburg manipulated land and property markets in unique, contextually-
specific ways; and (2) that the speculative behavior of property developers more generally is
underestimated in theoretical understandings of firm behavior, urban form, and firm relocation.
My aim is to show how property developers play a critical role in setting the terms for
where and how firms can locate. Property developers can often drive cluster development in
ways that are far more relevant than pure market mechanisms, individual firm behavior, or
government interventions. What is more, in the absence of any state control, property
developers can (and do) actively manipulate markets in such a way as to manufacture demand.
This can lead to highly inefficient outcomes. However, it can also lead to new morphologies of
cluster formation. Exploring these dynamics is the primary purpose of the following chapter.
See Chapter 2.
The Logic
When I asked over twenty property developers, city officials, and academics, about the reasons
for the flight of business out of the Johannesburg CBD, they mentioned (in varying order) things
like crime and grime, political unrest, racism, weak city management, the physical decay of
buildings, new technological requirements for firms, and global trends of post-industrial urban
decline. Weighing these factors against one another, I had difficulty in selecting a single
dominant factor.
However, Soraya Goga's chapter on "Property Investors and Decentralization" in the
new publication Emerging Johannesburg (2003), highlights a critical factor that my interviews
failed to unearth. She points to the responsibility of oligopolistic property investors and
developers during the mid 1980s in: Providing the office space in the northern suburbs-even in
the absence of a demand for it; encouraging their inner city tenants to relocate; setting off a
crisis of confidence amongst business and retailers in the inner city.
She argues that the unique characteristics of both the property market and the broader
economic climate during the late 1970s and early 1980s in Johannesburg precipitated the
exodus of business out of the CBD.
Her argument, in brief, is that the unstable economic climate of the late 1970s and 1980s
sparked high inflation in South Africa. Households responded by investing disproportionately in
pension funds and insurance. These pension and insurance outfits reinvested the money in
property markets. Poor market information, an oligopolistic property market (dominated by
about seven major banks, pensions and insurance companies), and skewed opportunity costs
(investing in any other area was tenuous, given the economic and political climate at the time)
fueled massive over-development in suburban commercial space. To recover profits on these
properties, the developers offered deep incentives for firm relocation within the city of
Johannesburg. For these property owners, it became more profitable to write off their CBD
buildings and to market instead (to the same clients) their decentralized office locations.
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Let us now look at this phenomenon in closer detail.
At the heart of the matter was the period of economic volatility in the 1980s, caused
simultaneously by the international economic recession, the sanctions imposed on South Africa,
and the political instability in the late apartheid years. As Jones and Muller report, "In the
1980s, high inflation rates (about 13% for most of the 1970s and 1980s) led to increased
investment by households in insurance and pension funds as a form of savings" (1992; cited in
Goga, 2003: 73). Practically, this meant that South Africans' money went disproportionately to
the major pension and insurance houses: Old Mutual, Sanlam, Rand Merchant Bank, JHI,
Ampros, etc.
Given the massive infusion of capital from South Africans seeking to protect their
investments from inflationary penalties, these firms had to find a place to invest the money.
They could not invest abroad both because of sanctions and controls on foreign exchange.
Business-a sound place to invest under normal situations-was also a non-option for two
reasons. First, local manufacturing output had been declining (in line with international trends)
for several years. Second, political uncertainty exacerbated by the violent anti-apartheid
struggles in the townships, and a growing sense that a black government would rise to power,
additionally rendered investors wary of investing in local business or manufacturing. The only
remaining option was to invest in property.
The pension fund/insurance market in South Africa was (and continues to be) heavily
dominated by a small number of players (arguably creating an oligopolistic market). "The
industry is extremely concentrated. A few large players control most of the pension funds and
thus investment. The largest two, Old Mutual and Sanlam, receive two-thirds of the total
premium income of all long-term insurers, and the top seven about 90%" (Goga, 2003: 75).
Goga notes that the oligopoly created a "herd mentality" among developers: even though there
was no demand for decentralized office space, when one developer opted to build an office
node outside the city, the others scrambled to keep pace.
This herd mentality was exacerbated by several other factors as well: a lack of sound
investment information (it was not until 1998 that South Africa had a uniform property index to
measure property performance); a lack of portfolio management; ad-hoc property management;
and skewed property funding schemes (Goga, 2003: 77). The system by which property
owners' valued property was not standardized. Owners and developers could perform and
advertise their own assessments of the property's value. This, unsurprisingly, led to significant
overvaluations of the properties, and served to further distort the market. Goga reports:
As one property analyst stated:
'...a big problem is that the big boys, and in fact everyone, values their properties
themselves. So they can create what values they want. Everyone says, 'oh,
well, the auditors will pick it up,' but the truth is that most of the auditors don't like
to challenge the books of the big boys-after all, they need work next year.'
What it meant for Johannesburg was that the perception of property as a 'good
return' continued even in the face of poor returns (Goga, p.78).
A final problem was the nature of pension and insurance houses as both property owner
and developer. Prior to this period of heavy investing in pension funds and insurance (during
the years of stable inflation), many South Africans would keep their money in banks. Property
was typically bought, developed, and sold by developers who took out bank loans to finance the
investments. This provided a system of checks and balances, since developers were reliant on
steady income from the property (in the form of rent) to incrementally pay off their bank loans.
In the case of the big insurance and pension fund houses, however, they had little concern for
the immediate income stream. They owned the property outright, so the more important factor
was the property's long-term capital gain. This effectively meant that they could increase the
supply of property even in the absence of any immediate demand.
This also meant that the big investment houses had to create demand for their new,
decentralized properties. In the absence of any economic growth, their only option was to
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encourage relocations out of the CBD. "These institutions were not averse to offer rentals in the
decentralized area to their clients in the CBD. Poaching of other CBD customers was also a
major strategy.
We negotiated with tenants sometimes in our CBD buildings to move out of the CBD and
into Sandton. We have mixed feelings about this-but we would do it anyhow. (Interview with
George de Bie, Liberty Life Property; cited in Goga, 2003: 80)."
Goga notes the crisis of confidence these maneuvers set off amongst CBD business
owners. 'The concentrated ownership structure in the CBD also meant that a single institution
attempting to sell its CBD portfolio has an enormous effect on the confidence of other investors"
(Goga, 2003: 80). Firms began to leave, en masse, for perceived stability in the northern
suburbs.
Their success in persuading CBD firms to relocate is remarkable considering the
economic climate at the time. In line with international trends, the South African government
pursued neo-liberal, export-led growth strategies since the mid-1 970s. They cut government
spending, removed trade protections, and curbed inflation by restricting the money supply. This
caused interest rates to skyrocket-increasing the costs of credit for all of the commercial outfits
of the city (Beall, et al., 2002: 36). This effectively meant that new capital was (and continues to
be) extraordinarily expensive. On the one hand, this explains why developers struggled to fill
their new decentralized commercial space with new enterprises. And on the other hand, it
makes a compelling testament to both the (financial) incentives offered for relocation and the
very real fear inspired by a collapse of confidence in the CBD.
Manufactured clusters
The major investment houses thus played a central role in creating spatial nodes of
development. Each of these institutions concentrated their investments in key areas in the
northern suburbs. By so doing, they effectively "manufactured" office clusters. How tenants
patterned their location was still to be determined, but the building blocks for clustered
development (notably decentralized clusters) in key nodes of the northern suburbs had been
laid.
As Goga tells it, "Rand Merchant Bank concentrated ownership in Sandton and
Sunninghill, Ampros in Bruma Lake, Liberty Life in Sandton, and AFC Holdings in Parktown"
(Rogerson, 1997: 3). The institutions were thus under pressure to ensure that these particular
locations, and not just particular investments, performed. It is perhaps for these reasons that
we see, in several cases, the relocation en masse of several tenants formerly housed together
in the CBD to the same decentralized location. That is, we see (on occasion) the
decentralization of clusters, but not the decentralization of firms themselves.
Some intermediate conclusions and further questions
The role of property developers in promoting the business flight from the CBD brings up some
key issues, in relation to this exploration of the role of exogenous, non-economic factors in firm
relocations. Namely, can we assert that property developers "manufactured" cluster
development?
What role did property developers play in stimulating firm clusters? To what degree did
they target similar firms to locate in their nodes? To what degree did they use proximity to
similar firms, or users and suppliers, to market their particular area? And in the incidence of
clustered development, how can we assign agency? How can we measure which party played
the greater role in fostering cluster development-the property developer or the firms
themselves?
Firm survey results
To answer some of these questions, I conducted a phone survey of a sample (n=1 6) of firms
from my data on Johannesburg relocations. In the survey, I asked why they left, and why they
relocated where they did. I asked questions about their property ownership (both in CBD and
current locations) to determine whether firms followed their property owners, or more organic
market forces.
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It was difficult to identify any correlation between property ownership in the CBD and
property ownership in the relocated space. Many of the interviewees did not know who owned
their property-then or now.8 For those who did remember, there was no case of correlation
between property ownership in the CBD and in the relocated space.
I also asked questions about whether there was a particular property developer that
assisted them. Again, this was in an attempt to determine which owners of the decentralized
properties were directly involved in recruiting firms to leave the inner city. This question also
was very difficult to elicit reliable information on, since the employees interviewed could not
remember, were not working at the firm at the time of relocation, or were not involved in the
relocation process.
Though a comprehensive survey was outside the scope of this paper, the speculative
behavior of property developers and their role in inducing relocations warrants some theoretical
attention.
Integrating observed reality into a theoretical framework
In Johannesburg, property speculators drove spatial change in the city. They behaved in rent
seeking, profit-driven manners. If we know this about the nature of the property market, then
why does the new economic geography literature fail to consider it?
The assumptions in the literature include the following:
1. Property behaves on a market-based, supply and demand model.
2. Government intervenes to stem property market failures (typically through
zoning regulations).
3. The property market is perfectly competitive-or at least monopolistically
competitive.
My argument about the relevance of property developers in dictating cluster development is not
altogether deviant from the theoretical frameworks of firm location and relocation. This
8 This information could be gathered using city valuation rolls-and would be interesting for further
studies. However, I could not access the valuation rolls electronically, so had to rely on these informal
surveys.
argument fits loosely into the category of institutional location theory. As Brouwer et al.
describe,
The institutional location theory starts from the assumption that economic
process in space is rather shaped by society's cultural institutions and value
systems than by firm behavior. It views the location behavior as the result of the
outcome of a firm's negotiation with suppliers, governments, labor unions and
other institutions about prices, wages, taxes, subsidies, infrastructure, and other
key factors in the production process of the firm. This approach is more suited
for large firms that have more negotiating power and are able to influence their
environment. However, it can also be applied to explain small and medium sized
firms' location behavior, which is mainly influenced by government policy and the
real estate market (Brouwer et al., 2002: 4).
Brouwer et al. could easily be referring to the Johannesburg property market in the mid-1 980s.
The large firms-the trusts, banks, and insurance giants-accumulated enough stores of capital
to influence the real estate market. By extension, they essentially dictated the location
decisions then faced by the small and medium firms that comprised the majority of inner city
firms.
Institutional location theory rightly credits power relations within the micro-level
negotiations in determining property transactions and firm decisions. In this case, a handful of
property owners were empowered by their oligopolist hold on the property market. This enabled
them to skew the market sufficiently to push CBD firms to new, decentralized locales. Firms
were essentially location-takers in this situation.
The work of James Rauch is helpful in articulating the interplay of property developers
with firm clusters, location decisions, and property markets. He argues that developers engage
in discriminatory pricing of land over time, in order to overcome the problem of first-mover
disadvantage that can prevent relocation. His exploration of developer land-sale strategies are
helpful in unpacking the dynamics that developers everywhere (not just South Africa) can
capitalize on asymmetrical information and oligopolistic market structures to manufacture
demand for office space. He contends that
...A great deal about the economics of agglomeration and the degree of
importance of history in determining the location of city-industries can be learned
by looking at the behavior of real-world developers and, in particular, at the
behavior of developers of 'industrial parks' (also called industrial estates or
industrial districts) who are explicitly attempting to capitalize on firm
complementarities" (Rauch, 1993: 846).
Though discussing an industrial park (rather than a retail or high-tech cluster), Siegle highlights
illustrations of an industrial park's power to facilitate agglomeration through creating "a kind of
'self-fulfilling prophecy"' (1992; cited in Rauch, 1993:846). Clusters do not necessarily develop
organically. Rather, they can be virtually manufactured by these powerful developers.
Attracting "seed tenants" and exploiting firm learning
An important first step is in recruiting "seed tenants" to a cluster. "In the first stage of
development land is sold to one or more 'seed tenants' who will 'set the reputation and
character of the project and of the tenant mix'...these seed tenants are 'loss leaders' and if the
same terms were offered to all subsequent tenants the developer would 'go bankrupt"' (Beyard,
1992; cited in Rauch, 1993:856). As Rauch reports, "Lee and Wong find for the developers they
surveyed that 'an aggressive promotional program' for an industrial park accounted for 14 to 28
percent of total costs" (Lee and Wong, 1958, cited in Rauch, 1993:846).
Developer land-sale strategy has important insights for inter-firm externalities and
spillovers. If we look closely at how developers discriminately price land in the new
developments, we can see how they both manipulate and exploit the dynamics of firm learning.
Specifically, the use of price 'phasing' is a developer strategy that "can be interpreted as
evidence that (at least some) inter-firm externalities are realized with a lag and that their effects
on profits are concave in the number of firms" (Rauch, 1993: 863).
How does this work? First a developer recruits a seed tenant by offering that firm a low
price on the new property. The developer then waits-and refrains from placing all of the
available land on the market.
If learning is especially rapid for the first few firms, it may make sense to sell only a few
units of land in the first period because the higher price that firms in the second period will be
willing to pay will more than make up for the cost of waiting to receive their payments... If later
firms contribute little to learning, it may make sense to hold some units of land off the market
until the second period because the higher price one can charge these firms will more than
make up for the slightly lower price one can charge to the firms that come in the first period,
(Rauch, 1993: 862).
The developers' accurate anticipation of the rates of firm learning will then determine the
level of profits to be reaped. Obviously seeking to maximize profits, the developer will seek to
assemble firms in ways that will maximize the perception of firm learning.
This indicates that firm clusters actually develop in ways that are quite different from
what one might intuitively suspect. Even if we assume that a developer is acting under
conditions of perfect knowledge, (which they demonstrably were not in Johannesburg) there will
still be quite inorganic assemblages of firms. For example, if a firm that engages and invests
heavily in R&D is recruited as a seed tenant, there may be a lag in the cluster's development-
simply because the property developer is refraining from selling the adjacent land until the
profits from the sale can be absolutely maximized. In another scenario, firms perceived to be
low-learners might be recruited simultaneously to purchase property in a cluster. This would
lead to a rather ad-hoc assemblage of firms, perhaps resulting in new forms of learning.
This analysis points out the positive features of this "inefficient" market manipulation by
property developers. Rauch effectively claims that their price manipulations can actually benefit
firm learning.
Perhaps countering these potential benefits, however, are the realities of inefficient
markets created by this type of land speculation. We know that such speculation can distract
investment away from other, arguably more deserving, pursuits. The money could be invested
more efficiently (or more equitably) in productive small or medium sized enterprises, in black-
owned enterprises, or in spatial areas of the city that are underrepresented.
Rauch's demonstration of the potential economic gains of this type of market failure is
provocative. His analysis implies that it is in government's interest to give developers monopoly
power. This "inefficient" market form may actually promote firm learning. Though it may
promote firm learning, will it necessarily lead to collectively desirable efficient outcomes? Do
speculation and capitalist accumulation promote such outcomes?
Speculation and Capitalism
At the core of this story of "failed" property markets in Johannesburg is a question of whether
indeed this is a case of market failure or unfair competition. Could it not be argued that
speculation and opportunistic behavior are the rules of the Capitalist game? Indeed, one
property developer I spoke with argued just that:
I believe that Goga is rather Socialistic in her view and fails to take cognisance of
normal opportunism that any businessperson would exploit. It is a fact that the
financial institutions held large amounts of cash that they could not invest under
the apartheid regime. However, survival of the fittest was the game and
institutions were protecting the income stream of their property portfolios. If a
tenant was indicating a wish to move to the suburbs then the institutions would
act quickly to secure or "steal" the tenancy (E-mail correspondence, Interview F,
24 Apr 03).
Though it may be standard business practice to compete, does the capitalist ethic contain room
for demand to be manufactured? By creating supply in advance of demand, is there not a
danger of overaccumulation? Is overaccumulation antithetical to capitalism, or its defining
feature?
These questions are particularly salient when the commodity in question is land. When
land is treated as fictitious capital, land development becomes "...simply a matter of choosing
what kinds of assets to include in a general portfolio of investments. And this, of course, is
increasingly how pension funds, insurance companies, and even private individuals tend to view
land investment" (Harvey, 1985: 97-98). Without effective zoning regulation, property
developers effectively gain a monopoly on land-use decisions. They "insert themselves as the
prime movers creating new spatial configurations of the built environment..." (Harvey, 1985:
102).
In Johannesburg the built enviironment was indeed transformed, at the lead of
speculators, into an arguably inefficient one of decentralized, suburban urban form. Harvey
contends that this predetermined urban form leads to a "post-hoc rationalization of a 'choice'
that really was no choice" (Harvey, 1985: 105). Businesses, in other words, were location-
takers-subject to the range of sites made available by the landowner and developer.
Is there any inherent danger in developers and financial institutions dictating the terms of
land development? "Developers look at the opportunity and will pander to the needs of
business" (E-mail correspondence, Interview F, 24 Apr 03). The individual needs of business
may be effectively met. However, whether an efficient outcome on a more collective level is met
seems dubious. Is it in a city's interest, for example, to pursue decentralized development?
Sandton, considered by many to be Johannesburg's "new" CBD, (Interview E, 2003;
CDE, 2002; Interview 0, 2003), quickly learned that the benefits of increased tax revenue from
incoming businesses were unlikely to compensate for the major expense of laying new roads,
sewer pipes, and telecommunications infrastructure. Peter Gardiner, Sandton's mayor in 1982,
lamented,
The cost of upgrading the infrastructure to service the massive office rights
granted over the last few years on the periphery of our town centre will severely
aggravate the rates burden rather than achieving the then announced intention of
relieving it. That these rights were granted on the misguided notion that the
roads need was not a limitation on development as the role of the car would
diminish and that of public transport would increase, is tragic for Sandton"
(Prinsloo, Report on the future development potential of the office component in
Sandton, circa 1982: 9).
The impact of relocations on urban form clearly affected Sandton's residents (and presumably
other northern suburbs' as well), to say nothing of their effect on the abandoned site, the CBD.
The consequences of unrestricted development patterns on the public good raise questions
about why there was so little done by government to intervene.
Mechanisms for Regulatory Intervention
The role of government will be explored in greater detail in Chapter 5. However, the
failures of both government's industry regulation and the property industry's failure to self-
regulate bear mention here. Pinpointing areas for government intervention demonstrate key
levers for preventing over-speculation in future cases-inside and outside of Johannesburg.
The South African government failed to regulate an oligopolistic market through, for
example, bringing anti-trust legislation against them. Second, the government did not oversee
swelling overexposures to property by the major investment houses. Investor portfolios typically
contain four investment categories: government bonds, fixed interest, stock exchange, and
property, (Interview D, 21 Jan 03). The government sets the allowable proportions for these
categories, to prevent overexposure in any one category.
The industry itself failed to self-regulate its actions through failing to standardize a
property valuation system. Additionally, they failed to develop (until 1998) a property index by
which property performance could be measured.
Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to argue that in the 1980s, land development in decentralized
(non-inner city) locales was driven by an oversupply of land and special incentive schemes by
property developers. The oversupply of decentralized office space was as much a factor in firm
relocations in the 1980s as the threat of inner city decay.
In the 1990s, however, inner city decay became a reality. Crime rates went up, informal
traders moved in, and squatters invaded the abandoned office buildings and residential towers.
This changed the nature of the exodus of firms from one that was supply-driven to one that was
demand-driven. That is, firms were now demanding decentralized office space, in an effort to
get away from the inner city. They no longer needed to be persuaded by property developers.
There was no longer speculation about the inner city. Decay had set in.
During this period, the demand for space was dictated purportedly by concerns over
safety and security above all else. Driven out by crime, these firms relocated in different
patterns from their predecessors. It is much more difficult to correlate initial locales in the CBD
with subsequent locations in the northern suburbs. The property developers no longer had to
appeal to their CBD tenants to relocate to their holdings in the north, since they'd already begun
to achieve reasonable occupancy rates.
This change from supply-driven to demand-driven firm exodus will be explored in the
next chapter. In both cases, despite the different natures of the drivers of CBD exodus, they
maintain one common feature: their non-economic nature. Firms in Johannesburg, in both
periods, located for non-market, inorganic reasons-reasons that are rarely, if ever, touched on
in the clustering and firm location literatures. This broader critique of the shortfalls of theory
should be borne in mind through the following pages.
Chapter 4: The Paranoid City
Crime, insecurity, and firm relocation in 1990s Johannesburg
"Every member of my family has been robbed. Can you say that about every city?"
- Interview A, 30 Jan 03
Crime has become a defining feature of Johannesburg's character as a city. Johannesburg is
perceived to be the crime capital of a country that is "riddled with violent crime" (Shaw and
Gastrow, 2001; cited in Beall et al., 2002: 177). More people are victims of crime in the city's
province, Gauteng, then in any other province in South Africa (Monitor, 2000). In Johannesburg
itself, between 1993 and 1997, two thirds of residents were victims of crime (Louw et al., 1998a:
3). And within the city of Johannesburg, the CBD has among the highest incidences of crime.
Crime touches everyone in the city, including businesses. The City of Johannesburg
claims that the effect of crime on business is unparalleled. They cite a 2000 World Bank study
on the constraints to private sector business growth. None of the 100 surveyed countries listed
crime as a constraint to doing business. "However, in a survey of 360 Johannesburg firms, 70
percent mentioned crime as a major obstacle to growth" (Joburg 2030, 2002: 20). Given the
high incidence of crime in the CBD and its impact on firm behavior, is it any surprise that firms
left the CBD for "safer" locales?
In this chapter, I begin by describing the high crime levels in Johannesburg, and their
proven impact on firm behavior. I present the results of my firm survey that sought to determine
firms' perceptions of push factors and the relative importance of crime. This survey, in addition
to existing surveys on crime and firm behavior, supports the popular wisdom in Johannesburg
that crime drove the most recent firm relocations out of the CBD. However, as I demonstrate,
these reports do not explain why firms relocate given that crime is fairly ubiquitous throughout
the city. If no place was safe, why would firms relocate?
Crime was (and continues to be) perceived differently in the CBD for three reasons: (1)
Crime was slightly higher in the inner city; (2) Dense urban form made crime visible; and (3)
People were uncomfortable with the "graying" of the CBD. By "graying", I refer to a sense of
insecurity around the CBD's changing racial makeup, influx of immigrants, rise of the informal
sector, and the shift from a business district to mixed-use land divisions. In this chapter, I
contend that perceived insecurity about the changing urban form-prompted somewhat by
crime and perceptions of crime, but mostly by insecurities about the graying of the area of the
CBD-pushed firms to relocate.
The Case for Paranoia
In my interviews and research, I found overwhelming agreement that crime was a key driver
pushing firms out of the CBD. In an informal telephone survey of 16 firms, I asked
respondents directly: "To what degree did crime in the CBD affect your decision to relocate?" I
offered them four options: "not at all"; "somewhat"; "significantly"; "it was the primary factor."
Respondents from 9 firms that left the CBD in the 1990s overwhelmingly cited crime as
the "primary factor" in the decision to relocate.
Not at all: 2
Somewhat: 0
Significantly: 1
Primary Factor: 6
The two firms that claimed that crime was not a factor in their relocation decision were involved
in mergers and acquisitions.
In an attempt to avoid limiting their range of responses for why they left the CBD,
I prefaced the question about crime with the question: 'Would you briefly summarize why
your firm left the CBD?"
Their responses continued to cite issues of crime and fear. An employee at Nonyongo &
Associates told me, "The CBD was becoming too dangerous." Gerald Horwitz Attorneys
echoed, "Security was the main reason."
Some respondents differentiated between the perception and reality of crime. An
employee at Gold Coin Exchange noted, "Our clients did not want to come to the Carlton Centre
(in the CBD) anymore. Although nothing ever happened to our clients, there was a perception
of crime." Similarly, Gerald Carson & Associates told me, "My clientele felt it dangerous to enter
the CBD so I had a choice of either consulting with them wherever they might be, at my cost, or
leaving my offices so they could consult with me."
The responses changed significantly when I asked three firms that left the CBD in the
1980s the same set of questions. All three firms said that crime did "not at all" affect their
decision to relocate. They noted, "It wasn't bad then. There was no (crime)...nothing like
today," (Link Insurance Brokers (Pty) Ltd). "At that time, the CBD was crime-free," (NP Shipping
Services). Their responses demonstrate the newness of crime as a rhetorical push factor in the
1990s.
How did the firms that stayed in the CBD respond to the same questions? Surprisingly,
concerns about crime still came to the fore. Out of three firms with whom I spoke, two claimed
that crime had affected their businesses "significantly." An employee at Levisons reported, "Up
until the government decided to change everything in town, security-wise, we were hit bad.. .The
company was robbed twice in one year." They were compelled to stay in town nevertheless to
maintain proximity to their client-base, (mostly black South Africans living in the southern parts
of the city). He said that during the periods of high crime in the CBD, they just braced
themselves: 'We had that hope of 'we can make it'.
Similarly, an employee at Brugman Inc., a law firm, still located in the Carlton Centre (in
the CBD) noted that crime had been a problem, but was improving. "Currently, we're not
affected by crime. We have security guards on the streets. It was quite different ten years ago.
We had smashed windows and that sort of thing..." When asked why they stayed, she
answered: "Everybody was leaving, and we considered going, but it was so convenient to be
close to the courts. And things have gotten better-it's quite safe now."
Other firms do not mirror their resilience. My data indicate that most law firms left their
CBD locations for northern suburb locations-despite the position of the courts (where
advocates need to travel twice a day) in the CBD. Out of 77 legal firms that were located in the
CBD in 1996, only 15 stayed in the CBD, (Author's dataset, 2003).
Firms believed that they were pushed out of the CBD, to a large degree, because of
crime and the perception of crime. Why did they choose their new locations? To what degree
do they cite safety and security as locational assets? I found little explicit mention of secure
surroundings being a real asset of the new location. Only one firm-Nonyongo & Associates-
overtly mentioned security. "(Our new location) is quiet, safe, clean, and properly policed."
How did firms explain their choice of a new location, if not for better security? Some
firms mentioned issues like proximity to clientele and bigger facilities as key assets in their new
locations. Three firms mentioned their new positions in shopping centers. The shopping center
itself could arguably appeals to the need for a secure environment. Shopping centers in
Johannesburg have become security enclaves for both businesses and customers. Security
guards carefully monitor all entrances, stroll the mall, and patrol the parking lots. Moreover,
these areas limit commerce to formal businesses.9
9 An interesting caveat to this point is the development of informal markets in parking lots near, or
attached to, some of the city's major shopping malls. Rosebank Mall hosts the city's biggest informal
market-something like an organized flea market-every Sunday on one level of its parking lot. Another
large informal market, Bruma Market, operates daily in a parking lot across the street from Eastgate, one
of the city's first shopping malls. These markets host retailers both from South Africa and other African
countries. They offer a controlled, safe environment for residents and tourists to buy anything from arts
and crafts to spices. This coexistence of informal and formal retail demonstrates one of the ways in which
the city has addressed the task of integrating.
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What can be learned from the survey responses? First, crime as a push factor for
businesses parallels increases in the incidence of crime. People's perceptions are not entirely
unfounded. When crime rates rise, there are direct impacts on business in the area. Second,
push factors do not necessarily mirror pull factors. Though insecurity may be the primary push
factor, security need not be the primary pull factor.
The fact that firms rarely cited security as an advantage of their new location is not
surprising. For one, crime continued to be a concern for all firms located in Johannesburg. Its
pervasive presence throughout the city meant that one suburb was not necessarily safer than
another. This suggests that firms chose their new locations not to escape crime, but to escape
a broader sense of insecurity-one that included racial tension, xenophobia, and coexisting with
vastly different income groups. Relocating enabled firms, their employees, and their customers
avoid these insecurities. It did not help them to avoid crime.
Newspaper accounts echo the survey respondents' belief that crime drove firm
relocations during the mid- to late-1 990s. Ann Crotty (1998) writes that the Johannesburg Stock
Exchange left the CBD, "...largely because of the crime in the CBD which has been a major
factor in most of corporate Johannesburg relocating to Sandton." Another newspaper article
describes the similar flight of PriceWaterhouseCoopers:
PriceWaterhouseCoopers blamed crime in the inner city for its move. It is
scheduled to relocate to Sunninghill (a northern suburb) next week, where the
company has taken up 1 2,000m 2 of space from its 1 3,000m 2 complex in the city
centre. "We need to offer a safer environment for staff," said Martin van der
Merwe, the office manager. "The building no longer suited our needs (Shevel,
1998).
PriceWaterhouseCoopers now resides in a massive, mansion-style office perched on a
hill overlooking Sunninghill. The complex has a patrolled entrance, and its office park
neighbors are hundreds of meters away.
Finally, there are a handful of reports that point incontrovertibly to the inverse
relationship between investment and crime. The Joburg 2030 report found the impact of crime,
... to outweigh investment decisions related to cost of capital, sales sectoral
growth and so on. Crime had an elasticity of 0.1 in the model; this means that
61 % of the decision to invest or not is determined by crime. In addition, the
model showed that if a firm perceived itself to be located in a high crime area, it
would invest 54% less than a firm that perceived itself to be in a low crime
area.. .The findings of this model show, without a shadow of a doubt and with
quantitative certainty, that investment in the Johannesburg economy will not take
place at the levels required until crime is addressed (Joburg 2030, 2002:21).
A World Bank study of the locational and investment considerations for large manufacturing
firms in Johannesburg echoed these findings:
... (The study) found that 95% of the CEOs at large manufacturing firms rank
crime and violence as the main constraints to investment and growth. Reflecting
the severity of the problem, follow-up interviews with senior managers revealed
that as many as 83 percent of the firms were victims of several types of crime in
1998. In addition, 61 percent of firms surveyed mentioned that their employees
were victimized on their way to or from work. On average, we found that firms
spent 1.6 percent of their sales revenue on security guards and devices in 1998.
Approximately 50 percent of the firms reported increasing their expenditure on
crime prevention between 1997 and 1998 (World Bank, 2000).
The problem of crime is clearly a significant one for Johannesburg's growth prospects. It is
important to outline this dynamic to differentiate between existing firms and new firms.
Though the Joburg 2030 and World Bank surveys offer interesting insights into crime's
impact on firm investment behavior, they do not indicate how existing firms respond. I maintain
that existing firms responded to crime and broader insecurities by relocating within the city.
Was this a rational decision? Did crinne occur uniformly across space? Crime may have driven
them out of the CBD, but was it any better in their new locations?
The ubiquity of crime
Crime, admittedly, occurred at higher levels in the CBD than in the northern suburbs.
The following map illustrates the incidence of murder in each area of the city, (see Figure 4.1).10
Murder is typically the most reliable crime statistic since it is the most difficult to cover up or
under-report. In and around the CBD, the murder rates per 1000 people (collected by police
precinct) range from 175-233. In contrast, the murder rates in the northern suburbs, where
firms are largely relocating, average between 11 and 50, with the exception of Alexandra-
notably on the border of Sandton, the seat of the "new CBD." Alexandra is a relatively self-
contained, or excluded, former township. Not only was there a murder hub very close to
Sandton, but the area just north of the CBD is included in the district of extremely high murder
rates. This area includes suburbs like Braamfontein and Parktown-two of the most prominent
destinations for the relocating firms. If crime occurred at only slightly lower levels everywhere
else in the city, why would firms be so eager to relocate?
Crime was and is ubiquitous throughout the city of Johannesburg. Time-series analyses
support the contention that crime was not only high in the CBD through the 1990s, but that in
most cases, it did not improve, (see figure 4.2).
10 To issue a disclaimer, South African crime statistics were notoriously unreliable until 2000. The
accuracy of apartheid-era police force data is unreliable because of under-reporting in some cases, and
exaggerated figures in other cases. As the police force went through the transition to a police service, the
collection of statistics remained faulty. The South African Police Service web page warns, "Please note
that the crime statistics, including those for the year 2000 and the first quarter of 2001, are data that was
collected before the SAPS implemented measures to improve the integrity and reliability thereof" (SAPS,
Crime Information Analysis Centre, 2003).
Figure 4.1: Map of Murder Incidence in the Greater Johannesburg Area: Murders per 1000 people
Source: CEROI, 2000.
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Overall, these figures demonstrate that crime was, in fact, a real problem in the CBD.
What's more, crime did not get better through the late 1990s. Businesses had little incentive to
stay given the high rates of crime. But why were they attracted to the northern suburbs? Can it
be said that there was correspondingly less crime there during these periods? The Star
newspaper published SAPS crime figures for June of 1997 that were leaked to the newspaper.
"It shows that Johannesburg's worst crime area was the CBD and environs, with 2 035 serious
crimes reported. Hillbrow was second with 1 840 cases, followed by Booysens with 1 437,
Sandton with 1 110 and Randburg with 1 042 cases" (The Star, 10 June 1997). The figures
indicate that Sandton's level of crime was nearly half that of the CBD-arguably providing
strong incentive for firm relocations. It should be noted that these figures aggregate all crimes.
1 Jeppe and Johannesburg are the two police jurisdictions that overlap with the CBD and surrounding
areas.
The Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council commissioned a study of Safety and
Security that offers less convincing evidence for the relative safety of the northern suburbs. The
following chart gives the approximate number of crimes in the most prevalent categories for
each station.
Figure 4.3.
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Crime clearly occurred with greater frequency, if only slightly, in the CBD than in Sandton.
These statistics indicate some spatial difference in the incidence of crime. Firms therefore
perceived crime differently in the CBD than elsewhere in part because it was slightly higher
there.
However, was this slightly higher incidence enough to motivate the wholesale relocating
of firms out of the CBD?
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Visibility of Crime
The CBD's dense built environment and population exacerbated the visibility of crime in
the CBD. This, too, perpetuated the perception of crime as being higher in the CBD than in the
northern suburbs. Discussing residential responses to crime, Charlotte Spinks (2001:9) notes,
"Citizens seek to alleviate socio-spatial fear and mitigate the incidence of crime by providing a
sense of protection via urban-form (e.g., walls protecting residence) and altered lifestyle (e.g.,
restricted spatial movement, limited social interaction)." Businesses, too, increasingly prefer to
ebb their sense of fear by constructing walls and fortress-type developments. While practically
these designs do little to exclude criminals, they offer the perception that customers and
employees will be safer. This appeal to perceptions is critical to attracting firms to the northern
suburbs. Although aggregate crime is not significantly lower in decentralized areas, firms may
perceive it to be.
A critical issue bound to the visibility of crime is that of income differences. Firms that
relocate to decentralized areas in the north typically move to wealthier areas than the central
city. Not only can firms provide their own private security, but they are more likely to have
neighboring firms who will do the same. This essentially means that the northern suburbs-
through a combination of public and private policing-receive better security coverage than the
CBD. This is starting to change with the introduction of privately contracted security providers in
the CBD (CCTV, Business Against Crime, BIDs, etc.). However, during the 1990s these
programs had yet to evolve. The spatial stratification of society in terms of crime and crime
prevention consequently biases the CBD against the suburbs (Bourguignon, 1999: 2). Firms
that move to the suburbs enjoy more visible crime prevention (through provision of security),
and less visible crime through decentralized development.
The irony, of course, is that crime does not actually decrease-despite the perception
that it should. Indeed, one of the fundamental criticisms of private security is that their profits
depend on a sustained level of crime in the community. When I confronted one security
industry executive about this tension, he argued, "Too much crime is always a problem. Right
now, we've got four times the amount of crime we should have" (Interview I, 24 Jan 03).
Perhaps crime levels could fall without affecting security industry profits. Several police station
commissioners I spoke with doubted this, however (Interview K, 24 Jan 03; Interview L, 21 Jan
03; Interview M, 20 Jan 03). "To illustrate the effectiveness of the private security companies:
security companies increased over the past few years by 1000%. So did crime" (Interview K, 24
Jan 03).
Despite disagreements about the effectiveness of private security, there is no question
that the amount of coverage in the northern suburbs is higher given their presence. As the
superintendent of a northern surburb police station lamented, "In my community... residents
spend 12M Rand/year on private security. My yearly budget is 2M rand. I can't even tell you
what I'd do with that 12M Rand. Let's just say there wouldn't be any crime" (Interview K, 24 Jan
03).12
The Graying of the CBD
Businesses' preference for a decentralized urban form was driven by more than just the lower
visibility of crime in the northern suburbs. It was also driven by the visibility in the CBD of the
informal sector, immigrants, poor people, and non-whites. Survey respondents, newspaper
accounts, and international reports are slow to mention such factors. These issues are difficult
to quantify and politically sensitive. In this section, then, I present an argument based on
evidence and experience that is largely implicit. The state mechanisms that led to an increased
informal sector presence, increased immigrants, and increased poor, non-whites' presence will
be discussed in the Chapter 5. I intend, here, to describe the coincidence of these groups'
permeation of the CBD and the flight of business out of the CBD, and to suggest that the two
are not unrelated.
1 12 million Rand was equivalent to about US$1.5 million at the time (January, 2003).
Of the 100,000 black people currently living in the inner city, 33,000 of them arrived
between 1991 and 1992 (Beavon, 1998: 375). These numbers emphasize the dramatic pace of
demographic change in the CBD. As one author noted, "Gray was misleading; the effect might
be gray from a great distance, as in the photograph taken from a satellite, whereas from close
up it was more like salt and pepper" (see Figure 4.4).
Any sudden change threatens the stability of the economic environment. The massive
demographic shift combined with a long history of tenuous relations between whites and blacks,
shook businesses' sense of security.
The influx of non-whites into the CBD also meant that a large number of poor people
began to inhabit the area. As Beavon stresses, "whereas the initial wave of black people to the
inner city was related to job opportunities in the CBD, many of the later arrivals were simply
seeking accommodation regardless of where they were employed, if they were employed at all"
(Beavon, 1998:375). By 1995, there were between 4,000 and 6,000 homeless persons in the
inner city (Fraser, 1995, cited in Beavon, 1998:375). "Some of its small parks (had) been taken
over by people living in shacks made of corrugated iron, cardboard, and plastic sheeting"
(Beavon, 1998:375). Prior to transition, the poor had been confined to townships. The
government did its utmost to provide housing and employment for poor whites near the CBD.
However, non-whites were relegated to fringe areas outside of the city.
The influx of the informal sector to city streets further exacerbated a sense of
insecurity. The number of participants in the informal sector exploded over the period around
transition. Beavon (1998:375) notes that in the 1980s, there were about 300 informal traders.
Figure 4.4: Photo of outdoor museum exhibit in Braamfontein; Hillbrow in background
Source: Author's photograph, taken in January, 2003.
That number had grown to about 5,000 by 1995. The overcrowding of streets and sidewalks
fueled businesses' (and their customers') insecurities about the relative safety of the CBD.
The demographic mix in the CBD has been shaped perhaps primarily by its immigrant
population. Though there has been some residential migration of black South Africans to the
inner city, immigrants dominate the residential mix in the CBD. South Africa's unwelcoming
attitude towards immigrants-exemplified through their restrictive immigration laws (often
compared to those of the United States and United Kingdom)-is both an institutional and
cultural problem. Xenophobic attitudes are perpetuated by accusations that immigrants are
taking scarce jobs from South Africans. The xenophobia often plays out in informal traders'
battles over sidewalk space in the CBD. Asylum seekers are legally prevented from working
and studying, and so have little recourse than to sell informally-under the gaze of the
government. The illegality of their trade (and occasionally their immigration status) excludes
them from citizenship and formal participation. This creates a sense of distrust and cleavage in
the community. On the one hand, people are forced to eke out a living selling informally on the
CBD's sidewalks. On the other hand, without formal participation rights, they have little stake in
the CBD's success or failure. Their presence thus arguably added to the sense of insecurity
among firms in the CBD.
Finally the CBD's character was changed by the introduction of more than one
functional use. Formerly a central business district, the CBD during the period around
transition witnessed the influx of squatters informally transforming offices to overcrowded
apartments. Formal and informal businesses competed for the same physical spaces. This
organic move towards mix-use zoning aggravated the sense of rapid change. That all of these
changes happened so quickly added to a sense of chaos. Employees and customers arguably
responded to this chaos by moving to areas they perceived to be less chaotic: the sleepy
northern suburbs of the city. The reality was that they would not escape crime. But they would
escape many of the rapid changes occurring in the CBD. By moving they could avoid physical
confrontations with immigrants, poor people, and non-whites.
The role of perceptions
Whereas in the 1980s the "graying" of the neighborhood was more of a threat than a reality, by
the 1990s, the neighborhood's demographic shift was clearly underway. Moreover, the
insecurities that these changes ignited were exacerbated (and arguably exaggerated) by the
tangible increases in crime. Though crime may have been high throughout the city, there were
key reasons why firms might have perceived themselves to be 'safer' in the northern suburbs.
There is the reality that the incidence of crime in the CBD is slightly higher. There is the
issue of high-density development rendering crime more visible to employees and customers.
There is the idea that crime, by its visceral and urgent nature, makes it an easy proxy for the
other set of insecurities like racial and economic integration. This is not to suggest that firms
themselves were opposed to integration. Indeed, many of the firms and business leaders that
left the CBD were instrumental in bringing down the apartheid regime, (CDE, 2002: 22;
Interview 0, 30 Jan 03). I rather argue that the climate for business was compromised by social
perceptions-of employees and customers alike-that the CBD had become a dangerous
(broadly construed) place to be.
Conclusion
Mike Nicol provocatively claimed, "urban crime has become a replacement for the civil
war that never happened," (The Star, 3 July 1996, cited in Marais, 2001). There is no arguing
that crime was (and is) extraordinarily prevalent in Johannesburg. However, given crime's
ubiquity, I argue that it should not affect the behavior of firms to the degree that is claimed, by
firms, reports, and news articles. I do not argue that crime was not a factor. Rather, crime was
abetted by a host of deeper, underlying insecurities with rapid urban change writ large. These
are the insecurities incited by the unfamiliar introduction of immigrants, poor people, non-whites,
and the informal sector to the CBD.
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The real civil war in South Africa is occurring at much deeper levels than simply crime-
it is the conversation (or lack thereof) being had between rich and poor, black and white, formal
and informal, and citizens and immigrants. This dialogue is happening-almost exclusively-in
the CBD. Firms perhaps understandably do not want to be a part of this dialogue. It obstructs
the normal functioning of economic activity.
The existing literature on firm relocation generally neglects these ambiguous distinctions
between push factors and proxies. There is little discussion of the role of race, formality, and
class perhaps because these issues are difficult to quantify, and difficult to model. However,
this should not detract from their importance. The literature makes reference to "institutional"
factors, which are meant to include crime. Pellenbarg et al (2002) develop a Logit model of firm
relocation that includes one variable labeled, 'stress tolerance threshold', meant to include crime
among other things. Krumme (1969) mentions 'increasing criminality' among a host of possible
relocation drivers. While these models do acknowledge the possible role of crime, aggregating
crime with a multitude of other factors tends to mask its relevance or irrelevance. These models
do not allow crime specifically to stand out from other potential factors. Moreover, they do not
distinguish between real crime and crime as a proxy for more nebulous factors like race or class
insecurities. Given their clear importance in the Johannesburg case, (and undoubtedly in other
contexts), we need to rethink the variables that these models use to determine, forecast, and
explain firm relocations. Policy makers need a more flexible framework that teases out and
differentiates issues like crime from issues like government policy or xenophobia, so that they
can craft targeted responses.
Insecurity, marked by the interrelated forces of crime, uncertainty, and distrust, is a
feature that seems inherent to the Johannesburg landscape. Both Johannesburg firms and their
customers have necessarily adopted strategies to cope with omnipresent insecurities. These
coping mechanisms are commonly depicted as high walls, surveillance cameras, and guarded
entrances. However, perhaps an additional coping mechanism is the "footloose" mentality of
these firms. When insecurities set in about the spatial environment in which they are located,
firms simply move. There is no question that such a mentality is enabled by the unusually low
prices of land in Johannesburg. It is an interesting hypothetical to think about whether crime
would have the same affect on firms if land were more realistically priced. If firms could not
afford to relocate, would they be pushed out of business entirely, out of Johannesburg, or
(perhaps idealistically) would they stay in their existing location? If they stayed in their existing
location, what alternative coping strategies would they devise? Would they partner more closely
with government to address the problems of rising crime and deteriorating physical conditions in
the CBD?
Though clearly these questions cannot be answered with any certainty, they raise further
questions about the role of the state in addressing some of these problems. Indeed, throughout
the last three chapters, one of the key questions that seem to emerge is, where was the state
while firms were flooding out of the CBD? Why was their seemingly no local attempt to curb this
exodus? In the next chapter, I address the failure of the local state to maintain the physical
surroundings in the CBD and to curb insecurities about crime, racial change, political change,
and economic decline. Though the state cannot be blamed entirely for business' exodus, there
were critical legislative, political, and institutional failures over the past two decades that
aggravated the decline of economic activity in the Johannesburg CBD.
Chapter 5: Johannesburg v. South Africa
Urban-National Conflict Pushing Business out of the CBD
"Of course there are obsolete and decaying cities in the world... But South Africa's cities are not
in that category... South African cities are threatened not through the logic of their natural
working but through over-regulation."
-Nigel Mandy, A City Divided: Johannesburg & Soweto, 1984:109.
We turn now to the role of the state in firm relocation. My intention with this chapter is to answer
the questions, why were businesses given the opportunity to leave the CBD? Where were the
municipal restrictions on development in the suburban areas? Where was the state when rising
crime was emasculating policing in the CBD? And why did so many firms complain that it was
poor city maintenance that induced their flight?
The key aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how institutions and laws affect the
behavior of firms. This ascribes some of the agency for firm relocation to the state. By the
state, I mean both local and national government. In the following pages, I analyze some of the
key institutions (organizations, political parties, and civil society actors), and some of the key
legislation to determine their impact both on the physical environment in the CBD and on the
incentives for doing business there.
The Johannesburg CBD provided the site for local and national government battles over
integration and agglomeration during the 1980s and 1990s. Many of South Africa's progressive,
anti-Apartheid reforms were first tested in Johannesburg, and particularly the CBD. As such,
Johannesburg endured an antagonistic relationship with the national government. The role of
national political parties in local administration ensured that the local and national governments
remain in constant confrontation. In this chapter, I argue that the national government and local
residents' conflicting visions for the CBD led to incoherent city administration. The resulting
erratic policies manifest themselves in deteriorating physical conditions of buildings, poor
maintenance of streets, and weak police coverage. The physical decay in the CBD created an
unstable business environment and exacerbated the crisis of confidence among firms located
there.
In this chapter, I describe the evolution of law, politics, and administrative change from
the 1980s through the 1990s. First, I introduce the CBD as both a business hub and a cultural
symbol. Second, I analyze the legislation that affected the CBD governance and business
climate. Third, I examine the three alternating political parties that govern the city over the 20-
year period, looking specifically at how national political agendas manifest themselves in urban
management and planning. Finally, I examine three key issues that are cited for driving firms
out of the CBD: hawkers, taxis, and crime. Throughout the chapter, I organize the arguments
into a push-pull framework of firm relocation, to demonstrate the key points where state action
affects firm behavior.
The Conflicted Identity of the CBD: Business hub and cultural symbol
For many years, the Johannesburg CBD has sustained a dual, and arguably conflicted, identity:
that of both business center and cultural symbol. Its most vocal defenders thus tend to be
strange bedfellows. Property owners, business tenants, and informal traders clamor for
government attention and resources to the area, albeit for different aims. Black residents
throughout the city view the CBD as a symbol of their empowerment and citizenship. Many
white residents hold the CBD as a nostalgic symbol of past prosperity. As such, the CBD wields
tremendous political weight among the city's administrators and politicians.
In an informal conversation with the current mayor of Johannesburg, I asked whether
citizens complained about the city's hyper-focus on revitalizing the CBD. He said, "It's a place
to start" (Interview G, 29 Jan 03). Perhaps in line with city voters, he views the CBD as the
barometer for the well-being of Johannesburg as a whole (Interview H, 14 Jan 03). Given that
the city faces severe budget constraints, this seems like a very practical (and convenient)
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approach for city government. Indeed, it is much easier to revive one district than to extend
service to more downtrodden places in the metropolitan area.
How does this erratic relationship between business and the city affect the dynamics of
firm relocation? Given a shared commitment to inner city management and maintenance, it is
surprising that the exodus of firms continued through the late 1990s. By analyzing some of
these institutions, laws, and their political contexts, I hope to offer explanations for why business
and government-until 2000-have been unable to stem the flow of (formal) investment out of
the city.
My argument in brief, is that three broad state-related factors triggered the flight of
business out of the CBD. First, three different regimes with competing ideologies and visions
for the CBD led Johannesburg during the 20 years around transition. Second, the city
consequently did not consistently maintain infrastructure or prevent crime. Finally, the diversity
of economic interests exercising a claim on the CBD, from property owners to hawkers,
continually expanded. This complicated constituent loyalty and led to less decisive action on
how to balance these diverse demands. These factors combined to create an inhospitable
business environment.
Laws
There are several key pieces of national-level legislation and local-level ordinances that
highlight the specific ways in which business in the CBD is affected by national politics.
Moreover, they provide a window into the extremity of the South African apartheid regime.
The Group Areas Act of 1950 mandated ethnic residential segregation. Each ethnic
group was confined to a given area, and expected to be self-servicing and self-financing. The
law itself had the effect of overcrowding the non-white majority of Johannesburg's population
into townships. Adding the impact of rural migrants (overwhelmingly black), the pressure on
residential space in the townships intensified.
Population pressure, national economic downturn, increasing inability of municipalities to
provide services, and political wariness with apartheid gradually induced the repeal of the Group
Areas Act in 1990. The process of its repeal began much earlier-in the mid-1 970s. "The first
areas in Johannesburg to be deracialised were the inner city areas" (CDE, 2002: 25). As the
inner city began de facto to abolish apartheid restrictions, demand for inner city housing
increased exponentially.
As racial segregation collapsed, releasing pent-up demand for accommodation
bottled up in the townships, blacks flooded into high-rise accommodation in the
CBD and its immediate environs, substantially changing the city's character.
This seemed to prompt more and more companies into leaving the city. These
two factors created a mutually reinforcing mechanism: the more the city
changed, the more companies joined the 'flight of white capital' to the suburbs
(CDE, 2002: 37).
During the early phases of deracialized settlement, "graying" of the neighborhood appears to
have been a primary factor in the city's changing "character" and thus in CBD firm behavior. As
time passed, the practice of renting CBD housing to non-whites disintegrated into overcrowding.
Because deracialized settlement was not officially legal, landlords enjoyed significant leverage
in demanding high rents from black tenants. If they complained, the landlord could report them
to the authorities, and press charges for violating the law, (Beavon, 1998).
This plight demonstrates the shaky position during the 1980s between local and national
interests. On the one hand, Johannesburg sought to rebel against national apartheid
legislation. On the other hand, they could not legally support the non-white CBD tenants. As a
result, landlords were able to engage in unfair practices with impunity.
Legislation intended to prevent neglect by landlords was both inadequate and seldom
applied by officials. The Rent Control Act of 1976, which regulates such matters as the
increase of rent and the right to eject a tenant from the premises, failed, for example, to cover
dwellings developed after 1949 (The Gaffney Group, 2003). A comprehensive law governing
the actions of landlords was not passed until 1997, with the Gauteng Residential Landlord and
Tenant Act 3 of 1997. In the absence of legislative action, landlords both permitted
overcrowding and failed to maintain the buildings appropriately.
These conditions created inhospitable business conditions insofar as the cleanliness,
ease of mobility, and arguably "color" of street culture affected the perceptions of employees
and customers. However, these push factors were aided by significant legal incentives pulling
these same employees and customers to the northern suburbs.
The deracialization of settlement occurred in tandem with an early 1980s state program
that offered subsidies to first-time homeowners. The program sought to provide incentives
for home ownership in the northern suburbs. On the one hand, this pushed whites out of the
residential areas in the inner city-further distancing them from the black areas of the city.
Arguably, this delayed racial confrontation and meaningful integration. On the other hand, with
more of their white employees leaving for the suburbs, the pressure on firms to follow them
increased.
In 1986, they abolished influx control restrictions, allowing Africans to move freely in
and out of urban areas (Marais, 2001: 49). Blacks increasingly migrated to the inner city for day
trading and shopping, increasing taxi and pedestrian traffic. Since the Black population tended
to have lower disposable incomes and Whites increasingly preferred the shopping malls of the
northern suburbs, the customer base for many retail outfits began to shift. This gave firms an
additional incentive to leave the CBD.
Finally, parking restrictions in the CBD, and a comparative abundance of parking in
the Sandton area, tempted some firms to leave. In 1980, the ratio of parking spaces to floor
space was "inadequate to satisfy the needs of developers of new buildings" (Mandy, 1984). In
the CBD, the ratio was 0.5-0.7 spaces to 1OOm 2 of floor space. In Randburg and Sandton, by
contrast, some office parks had ratios of 3.5-4.0 spaces to 1 00m 2 of floor space (Mandy, 1984).
These laws and ordinances changed the business climate in the CBD. The inability or
unwillingness of national and local government to mediate the laws' negative effects on the
business environment gave further incentive to firms to relocate. How did the politics of local
and national governments affect their treatment (directly and indirectly) of the CBD?
Politics
Each of these political parties brought a distinct agenda for urban development-and
therefore for both CBD and business development. Their differing agendas and internal political
struggles shaped both the business climate in Johannesburg at large, and the physical condition
of the CBD. In the next few paragraphs, I look at the three leaderships that alternately governed
Johannesburg over the past 20 years. In each era, the different national political ideals were
reflected in urban management. I contend that the conflicting approaches to urban
management affected the behavior of firms located in the CBD.
One political party historically dominated Johannesburg: the National Party. Infamous
for introducing apartheid planning to South Africa, this party held power at the national level
from the 1950s through the late 1980s. In Johannesburg, too, the National Party's dominance
was challenged in the 1980s as the economy began to suffer and apartheid segregation came
under increasing attack. The Nats, as they are commonly referred, held power in Johannesburg
until 1989. They were replaced by the Democratic Party, "a very liberal local authority,"
(Interview B, 23 Jan 03), who maintained local power until 1993. In 1993, a multi-party
transitional local government was appointed, to navigate the new structure and form of a
popularly-elected local government. Finally, in 1995, the ANC was elected to local government.
They have enjoyed that seat ever since.
The National Party (or Nats) rose to power on the strength of a simplistic response to
the problem of post-war black urbanization in the 1940s: apartheid. Their strategy of separate
ethnic development informed their policies through the 1980s. These ideals were reflected in
urban policy through various means. They attempted to supersede rebellious municipal
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governments by instituting Administration Boards, which regulated the supply and demand for
black labor. The National Party's tampering with labor markets and restricting free trade more
generally won little favor with Johannesburg businesses (Mandy, 1984: 289).
Though the National Party governed Johannesburg during most of the apartheid era, it
had to contend with anti-apartheid protests from as early as the 1950s. Johannesburg politics
thus held a shaky position between local and national. On the one hand, city political leadership
was often National Party-dominated. On the other hand, Johannesburg also posed the greatest
threat to apartheid leadership-both because of protest movements within the city, and because
the city (by nature of its density and cosmopolitanism) could not practically sustain racial
segregation.
During the tenure of both the Nats and the Dems, a single mayor and a management
commission ran South African cities. "Johannesburg's mayors are ceremonial figureheads who
customarily hold office for one year each. Real power is vested in the six councilors who
comprise the management committee, and in particular in their chairman" (Mandy, 1984: 328).
The management committee was not popularly elected, but rather elected by party officials.
Accountability was not to the populace, but to the party leadership. This administrative
organization inherently biased city managers in favor of national leadership.
The National Party in Johannesburg largely echoed the National Party of South Africa.
When calls for resource sharing between white and black municipalities arose in Johannesburg
in 1981, the city's management committee quickly shut them down. They argued that resources
could not be shared because municipal governance in South Africa was based on four
fundamental principles: (1) separate local authorities should be established for each race
group; (2) every local authority should be independent; (3) local authorities should be granted
autonomy; (4) each local authority should be self-financed (Mandy, 1984: 370-1).
We know that during the Nats' 1980s tenure, local government was sorely under-
financed. The bulk of local government revenue in Johannesburg came from taxes assessed
on businesses. Taxes in Johannesburg were assessed only on the value of the land, (Mandy,
1984: 365), meaning that the taxes in Johannesburg were higher than those in Sandton, which
had lower land values. The National Party, experiencing poor relations with business in
Johannesburg, was compelled to act on behalf of inflation-hurt households rather than business.
"The management committee desired ultimately to relieve (private householders) of the rates
burden, compensating for this by levying heavier charges on business" (Mandy, 1984:365).
Sandton, on the other hand, started out with a wealthier tax base of householders and could
provide better services than the cash-strapped CBD. Firms would be taxed less and receive
better services if they relocated to Sandton.
Lax planning laws allowed private sector land development in the northern suburbs to
proceed unimpeded. Why did the apartheid era government fail to regulate the property
market? First, participation in planning exercises was limited to a small set of decision makers.
"A management commission ran the city at the time. They were a very powerful group made up
of 10 people...There was no citizen participation other than crony politics" (Interview A, 30 Jan
03). Second, apartheid-era planners relied on a sectoral, rather than an integrated approach.
This resulted in overlapping or contradictory actions (Beall et al., 2002:81).
How did these features impair the ability of the apartheid government to regulate the
property market? First the lack of citizen participation in the apartheid-era local government
allowed officials to make development decisions that might be opposed by local residents.
Ironically, Sandton residents shared a strong anti-development mentality until the 1980s, when
a new business-friendly local government came to power.
There was a conservative group of people living in Sandton for many years.
They had anti-development policies. Sandton was entirely a peri-urban area.
Then, in the early 1980s, they were ousted by pro-development folks. These
people implemented tax cuts and created incentives for relocation. They offered
incentives to move out of office stock that was reaching its sell-by date (Interview
B, 23 Jan 03).
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The management commission design of local government facilitated the dramatic policy change
from anti- to pro-development proclivities in Sandton.
More than failing to regulate the property market, there was a tendency for Sandton
officials to promote an unfettered wave of development. In other words, Sandton directly
promoted firm relocations through both lax property development and through tax incentives for
businesses (Beavon, 2000; cited in Beall et al., 2001: 56).
Why was there not more of an effort on the part of the Johannesburg management
committee to prevent this? For one, the management committee mirrored national government
party ideals, which clashed with those of business in Johannesburg. For another, the
management committee did not have the financial resources at their disposal to invest heavily in
maintaining the CBD. Finally, the influx of people into the CBD arguably overwhelmed any
response the city could have made.
In the 1980s, things continued to go wrong. Local government didn't want to deal.
The National Party government tried to wash their hands of the Johannesburg
government. The Democratic Party picked up the reins, but could see where the
city was going. There was a kind of defeatism. It didn't matter what you did,
there wasn't enough time to do it (Interview A, 30 Jan 2003).
The Democratic Party (DP) came to power in Johannesburg in 1989, with the election
of management committee chair, Ian Davidson. The DP's election in Johannesburg sent a
strong message to the national government about the city's dissatisfaction with the National
Party. The Democratic Party was not allied with the ANC or the Nats. Rather, its national
membership included English white liberals, business, and the media (ANC, 2003). lan
Davidson matched this profile. "He was a former stockbroker who believed passionately in the
CBD. He was very opposed to Sandton's development. His own party was trying to pull north,
but he really struggled against it" (Interview B, 23 Jan 03). Despite Davidson's personal
commitment to the CBD, he faced strong resistance from strands within his own party-most
strongly from a movement called the "Northern Alliance."
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The Dems saw that Soweto would be linked to the CBD. The pro-Sandton Dems
were terrified. In fact, there was a proposal at one point for a 'Northern Alliance'.
Sandton would take responsibility for Alexandra, and Joburg (the inner city)
would take responsibility for Soweto-and the townships to the South.
Ian Davidson, still committed to the CBD as an urban node, convinced the
provincial government to locate there. Local management during this period was
very strong.
Urban management was not lax at that point. There were environmental
upgrades, inspections of inner city buildings, successful relocations, and
effectively managed bylaws (Interview B, 23 Jan 03).
Despite a commitment to bylaw enforcement, pressure from street traders overwhelmed local
capacity. "The local authority's capacity to manage was compromised by the tremendous
pressure for people to use the streets. In the 1990s, there was an incredible increase in street
trading" (Interview B, 23 Jan 03).
Adding to the constraints on the Dems' ability to maintain the inner city were the political
and bureaucratic challenges. As Morris notes,
Despite the DP's more enlightened rhetoric, numerous issues contributed to the
minimal impact of the (City Council) from 1990 to the end of November 1994.
The first constraint was a bureaucratic and political one. Even though the DP
was the dominant party, it had to work through the old bureaucracy which had
been in place during the years of NP domination. The DP itself was a political
party that was more capable of supporting the interests of the wealthier
constituents (Morris, 1999: 162-3).
The DP's bureaucratic baggage from the previous regime, and its political baggage of a
constituency rooted largely in the northern suburbs and big businesses, distracted the
administration from decisively managing the CBD.
The Dems relinquished power in 1993 at the mandate of the Local Government
Transition Act of 1993, which negotiated a post-apartheid city organization and provided for
temporary governance until the 1995 local government elections, (Beall et al., 2002: 74). During
this period, "there was no steering wheel" (Interview A, 30 Jan 2003). The city's focus was on
its own administrative reforms rather than city management. Deteriorating physical conditions in
the CBD fell secondary in the city's priorities to administrative restructuring.
102
When the African National Congress (ANC) took power in South Africa, the process of
administrative restructuring continued. The ANC sought to negotiate its two major municipal
battles (defining the city's administrative form and its boundaries) through its political agenda of
growth and redistribution.
When the ANC came to power, there were strong calls for immediate redistributive
measures-especially in the provision of basic services (i.e., electricity and water) to townships
and historically underserved communities. As Franzen reports:
Given the serious township services backlogs, Johannesburg's newly elected
councils embarked on ambitious capital programmes. Not allowed to budget for
a deficit, and despite unacceptably low payment levels, Johannesburg's councils
budgeted for a 100% debt collection until 1997-8. Coupled with poor financial
management (because of staff losses, inexperience, amalgamation, uncertainty,
disputes over powers and functions, and problems with the organizational
restructuring), and especially inadequate credit control measures to collect due
revenues, Johannesburg was bound to end up cash-strapped. Prudent financial
institutions were understandably reluctant to lend money to a city using operating
funds to pay for capital projects, and with ineffective credit controls; the risks are
just too high. Johannesburg found it increasingly difficult to access capital
markets to acquire funds for capital investments. By September 1997, with a
predicted R2 billion deficit at the 1997/8 financial year, it was clear that, without
strong and decisive intervention, Johannesburg was facing bankruptcy (CDE,
2002:32).
The new municipal government had over-spent on services and under-collected taxes from
residents. Important for CBD maintenance, the ANC allowed expenditure on infrastructure to
decay in favor of service expansion in underprivileged areas (Joburg 2030). Basic city
management functions were under-prioritized because resources were not available for non-
essential services.
To compound the problem, the ANC-led municipal government redrew the city
boundaries to include areas like Soweto and Sandton in Johannesburg proper. This maneuver
increased the population of Johannesburg by almost three times its size under the apartheid era
(Beall et al., 2002: 76). Although the tax base similarly expanded, this move led to the inclusion
of larger swaths of underserved populations. It also complicated the process of service
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provision because it necessitated the coordination and integration of previously disparate city
offices. Prior to this time, Sandton and Soweto were both autonomous municipalities.
As the city tried to cope with massive new strategies for extending services, it also
engaged in overhauling administrative governance structures. 'When the first transitional
government took power, there were 11 authorities consolidated into one. It was then
redistributed into 7 sub-structures. Later, this was further consolidated into 4 structures. Now,
we have Metro government" (Interview B, 23 Jan 2003). In total, there were 9 organizational
reviews and restructuring efforts (Emdon, 1999: 19).
How did institutional transition affect physical conditions in the CBD? This institutional
confusion was especially damaging for the CBD because it skewed its tax base. During the
period 1995-2001, when there were four sub-structures, and one metropolitan overseer, the
CBD was included in the most populous, and most poor sub-structure, (see Figure 5.1). This
meant that it had to forfeit a larger proportion of its tax revenues to provide for services in these
poorer areas. The CBD-being the seat of business-was comparably wealthy, and therefore
necessarily suffered from under-provision of basic services. Table 5.1 highlights the way this
arrangement exacerbated spatial inequality. The Southern sub-structure (including the CBD)
hosts 42% of the population. The contribution by business as a percentage of total rates is
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Figure 5.1: Map of municipal boundaries in Johannesburg, Pre- and Post-Transition
Source: Beall et al., 2002: 69.
Table 5.1: Percentage distributions of projected rateable income by sub-structure, 1996-1997
Municipal sub-structures
Eastern Southern Northern Western Total
Contribution by business as a percentage 45 35 17 3 100of total rated
Contribution by advantaged residential 44 14 32 10 100
areas as a percentage of total rates
Contribution by disadvantaged residential 63 7 24 6 100
areas as a percentage of total rates
Estimated proportion of the population 23 42 19 16 100
Source: GJMC, 1998; cited in Beall et al., 2002: 79.
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35%. In contrast, the Eastern sub-structure (including Sandton), hosts only 23% of the
population, and business contributions comprise 45% of total rates (Beall et al., 2002:78).
Sandton had more resources to provide services than the CBD. As a final example of
the budgetary differences, the EMSS (including Sandton) spent only 20% of its budget on
salaries, compared to the SMSS (including the CBD) that allocated 40% of its more limited
budget to salaries. Clearly, during this (albeit short-lived) period, businesses had clear
incentives for locating in Sandton rather than the CBD. Their taxes would be lower and their
services better.
These fiscal differences soon led to fiscal crises in the southern sub-structures, and calls
for metropolitan government. In 2000, a single metropolitan government structure was finally
adopted. However, the six years of indecision left their impact on the CBD. This institutional
trial and error affected the day-to-day maintenance of the city. During this period, crime
reached all- time highs, businesses continued to move out of the CBD, and hawkers traded with
little to no regulation.
This reality collided with the ANC's vision for its governance. Prior to their ascendance,
there was a widespread fear that the standards of development and the general quality of life
would deteriorate under a black government. Sensitive to the implicit distrust these fears
expressed-and anxious to prove that they could both maintain the existing infrastructure and
make it accessible to a broader citizenry-the black government centrally struggled to maintain
these "standards."
The democratization of local government, instead of assuaging widespread fears
of CBD downturn and inner-city decline, compounded public anxieties about the
maintenance of 'standards' by seizing on the issue of urban regeneration of the
inner city. This was especially the case during the interim phase of local
government and included the active encouragement of formal business (Beall et
al., 2002).
A hyper-attention to maintaining standards led to a process, continuing today, of real political
struggle over who controls the streets: formal business or the street traders.
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The problem of the street traders
The conflict over the street traders (or "hawkers") began in the early 1980s. Local government
policy became increasingly tolerant of informal-sector activity during this period (Rogerson and
Hart, 1989). Council licensing laws that prohibited trading were increasingly ignored. By 1991,
they were repealed entirely through the introduction of the Businesses Act 71 (Emdon, in
Tomlinson et al, 2003: 228).
Why were the Nats willing to relax enforcement of informal trading violations? Emdon
argues that in the early 1980s, a group of influential lawyers lobbied both the municipality and
national government to repeal the Council licensing laws. These lawyers were funded and
promoted by an organization called the Free Market Foundation (Emdon, in Tomlinson et al.,
2003: 228). The intention of the Free Market Foundation was not to help informal traders, but
rather to liberalize business environments. Their lobbying success demonstrates some of the
international influence of neoliberal thinking on National Party policies.
The negative impacts on the inner city of liberalizing trade were not felt until a decade
later. 'What had been a quaint revival of street life in the 1980s, became a massive problem of
unrestricted and uncontrolled street trading in the 1990s" (Emdon, in Tomlinson et al., 2003:
228). The abolition of the Council licensing laws gave informal traders the right to trade, while
the repeal of the influx control act permitted them to migrate freely in and out of trading areas.
The CBD, as the central trading locale, most seriously experienced these consequences.
The hawker issue presented (and continues to present) a fundamental challenge to the
ANC populist government. The ANC was elected by the members of the informal sector-low-
income residents who, in a city with high unemployment and few opportunities, were resigned to
selling their wares in unregulated stands. Their position in the informal sector placed them
outside the purview of taxpayers. The city found itself challenged with the fundamental problem
of whether to support taxpayers or citizens more broadly. Whereas the Democratic Party faced
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conflict within its party over how to manage the CBD, the ANC faced conflict within its ideology
over how to manage the CBD.
Business in the CBD had very little tolerance for informal trading. Any permissive policy
by the ANC was likely to irritate formal businesses located in the CBD. Indeed, as one jeweler
who owned a business in the CBD in 1986, but had subsequently moved to La Rochelle noted,
"Hawkers and cleanliness were real problems for us" (Interview, Alfnet Manufacturing Jewelers,
Apr 2003). Local government's irresolute approach (until quite recently) to the issue of street
traders exasperated formal business owners, and provided them still more reason to leave the
CBD.
The problem of the taxis
The massive influx of taxis into the Johannesburg CBD occurred as the influx control restrictions
began to ebb. "In the mid-90s, there was a collapse in the city's ability to clean the streets.
Taxis took over" (Interview 0, 30 Jan 2003). Both the demand and the supply for taxis
increased. The demand was fed by the increased number of blacks moving in and out of the
CBD to commute to work, trade on the streets, shop, or socialize. The supply was maintained
by the black entrepreneurs seeking employment in one of the handful of state-sanctioned black-
run businesses. This aggregate increase in taxi traffic "shattered the (city's) ability to maintain
CBD streets" (Interview B, 23 Jan 2003). The number of taxis in the CBD mushroomed to such
a point that they dominated (and largely continue to dominate) inner city traffic and on-street
parking spaces.13 Both the neglected streets and the chaotic presence of unregulated taxis
amplified a perception of "grime."
A lack of taxi regulation deteriorated physical conditions in the CBD. Local government
through the transition arguably should have done more to regulate taxis or provide better public
13 By taxis, I refer to "minibus taxis" or "combies," which are minivans that carry 18-20 people. They
represent the primary method of transportation for most black residents in the city.
108
transportation. Its failure is perhaps unsurprising. To this day, regulating the taxi industry
(which has earned a reputation for being violently competitive) continues to be a major obstacle
for local government.
The problem of policing
The problem of policing demonstrates how national-level institutions affect local politics and
local environments like the CBD. Policing in South Africa is centralized. The South African
Police Service (SAPS) is a highly bureaucratic, top-down organization. At its most decentralize
level are police stations.
There are two structural problems that impair the ability to control crime from the
perspective of the city. First, SAPS jurisdictional boundaries do not coincide with those of the
city. The following maps help to illustrate these overlapping boundaries (see Figure 5.2 and
Figure 5.3). For example, Soweto and Midrand are not included in the Johannesburg SAPS
area commissioner's jurisdiction.
This can mean two things: first, the city needs to maintain relationships with several
police commissioners who may have competing visions for crime control. Second,
commissioners may be reluctant to interfere in problems in neighboring jurisdictions (despite the
fact that these problems are still within the city borders, and therefore of import to city officials).
For example, when I confronted the Johannesburg SAPS area commissioner about a vigilante
group based in Midrand, (though arguably carrying out most of their "activities" in the
Johannesburg SAPS area), he shrugged his shoulders and said, 'That's in Midrand, that's
outside my jurisdiction" (Interview N, 30 Jan 2003).
This lack of coordination did not fuel the rise in crime in the inner city. However, it
arguably prevented coordinated, aggressive responses to crime, criminals could exploit this
emasculated institutional response to crime in the city. "Really big-time crooks saw an
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Figure 5.2: Map of current police jurisdictions (2003)
Johannesburg Are
Police Station Bundaries
Source: South African Police Service, Crime Analysis Information Centre, Braamfontein.
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Figure 5.3 Map of the current municipal jurisdiction (2003)
Source: City of Johannesburg, Spatial Development Framework, 2002.
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opportunity. If you get apprehended, you could get bail. The chances of getting a conviction
were low, because your rights were much better. Crime was profitable" (Interview A, 30 Jan
2003).
The city did not have any formal mechanisms at their disposal for controlling crime in the
city centre. "The area in front of Anglo American used to witness shootouts between police and
taxis. Managing the issue was a very real problem" (Interview 0, 30 Jan 03).
The situation now has been remedied to a degree. After significant debate, the national
and provincial governments agreed to let Johannesburg develop its own metropolitan police
force-charged with (a) traffic policing; (b) crime prevention; and (c) enforcing city by-laws (i.e.,
cleaning up informal traders off city streets). Though their latitude is limited, they have been
effective crime deterrents merely through their presence on the streets. Metro police continue
to struggle in defining their relationship with the SAPS. However, their creation has given the
city more muscle in coping with the extraordinary levels of crime. As the mayor noted "(Metro
police was created).. .partly because we thought security was a problem and partly because we
wanted to be proactive about crime" (Interview G, 29 Jan 03)."
Though the city has now developed aggressive institutions to cope with crime in the
inner city, their absence prior to 2000 emphasizes the lack of an effective institutional response
in earlier periods. I point this out not to assess blame, but to highlight the importance (and
challenge) of "getting the institutions right"-especially during periods of transition. Crime is
unquestionably a major factor in the flight of many businesses out of the CBD. In this case, a
failure of coordination between the city and SAPS, and institutional confusion through the
transition, turned attention away from the increasingly criminalized inner city.
Conclusion
For each of the political parties, the CBD was a highly politicized area. Under the National
Party, the CBD was the site of unofficial protest against apartheid policies. Under the
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Democratic Party, the CBD became the site of official protest against apartheid policies. Under
the ANC, the CBD has come to symbolize the measure of the new government's success (or
failure). From one regime to the next, formal business has sent a very clear message that it
prefers to be elsewhere. To what degree is the state responsible for their flight? In this case,
the state cannot be considered in isolation from the other factors (property markets, crime,
racism, political unrest). However, the political struggles between South Africa and
Johannesburg, played out in the physical space of the CBD, clearly affected the willingness of
business to locate there.
Through this examination of the role of the state in firm behavior, I hope to have
highlighted the importance of looking not only at municipal-level restrictions and national-level
legislation, but also at the politics that determine these rules. It is in making sense of the politics
that we can understand the logic underlying certain restrictions and legislation, and their
enforcement (or lack thereof).
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Conclusion
This study of firm relocations in the Johannesburg CBD makes two sets of contributions. Each
chapter provides a unique perspective on the exogenous causes of firm behavior. Together
they suggest that firm behavior is determined by factors exogenous to the firm, and endogenous
to the urban form.
Chapter 2 adds a new dataset to the location literature-one that can be analyzed in
future projects. These data should be helpful to students of both firm location broadly and the
Johannesburg case more narrowly. Furthermore, the mapping exercises in the first chapter
demonstrate the micro-level flows of firms from one urban space to another, and empirically
prove the flight of business out of the CBD.
The third chapter on the dynamics of over-development in the Johannesburg property
market brings attention to a subject that is sorely understudied in the location literature. The
role of property developers and institutional owners in determining the supply of land (both in
quantity and price) has real implications for the "footloose" tendencies of firms within a city. My
study raises a whole new set of questions around the degree to which property developers and
owners drive firm clustering. It also highlights the need for those studying location issues to
focus not only on the firms themselves, but on the property market and its structure. Skewed
market structure (i.e., oligopolistic, concentrated ownership), and poor market information can
heavily distort the location of economic activity.
The fourth chapter's focus on the role of crime and insecurity in firm location decisions
highlights another key driver of firm relocation that is almost never reported in the literature. I
demonstrate the serious impact that crime has on firm location. However, I offer a cautious
recommendation that this crime be placed in a larger historical context of insecurity. Though
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Johannesburg is notorious for its high levels of crimes, residents (and businesses) arguably
exaggerate the effect of crime in order to use it as a proxy for issues like racism, xenophobia,
and class conflict. This process of deconstructing insecurity, to analyze both crime and its
underlying factors, is critical both for understanding the complexity of the Johannesburg case
and for developing a more nuanced theory of firm relocation.
Finally, in the Chapter 5 analysis of the state's role in firm relocation, I emphasize the
importance of understanding the politics that define the hostile or hospitable character of certain
locations. Knowing the political and institutional context underlying firm relocation identifies the
"causes" of their flight as historically dynamic and rooted in a mix of political battles. This
unquestionably muddies the picture, and complicates the story of firm relocations. Perhaps this
is why the state is so rarely elaborated on in discussions of firm relocation. However, the role of
the state (in its absence or presence) is central to firm decisions. Analyzing the political context
presents a more historically accurate approach to analyzing firm behavior.
Taken together, these chapters demonstrate the power and influence of non-economic
factors (market failure, insecurity, and politics) on firms. They bring into question the legitimacy
of predictive theories of firm behavior that do not accord commensurate weight to these non-
economic (or exogenous) determinants.
What emerge from this study are a set of general behavioral restraints on firms and the
corresponding mechanisms that drive these restraints. Economic volatility can be analyzed
through the purview of property markets. Insecurity can be mapped through, (among other
things) crime rates. State failure can be monitored through the city's relationship with the
nation, politically, legislatively, and institutionally. These exogenous factors (economic stability,
security, and government) outweigh the benefits of proximities in the Johannesburg case. Firms
cannot operate efficiently in an insecure environment and/or with poor external conditions. If
attractive alternatives to these environments are provided, firms will opt to relocate. These
should not be surprising claims. However, it is precisely these external environments that are
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largely ignored by theory. It is precisely these environments that determine, before anything
else, the likelihood of a firm to anchor itself in a certain location.
How is Johannesburg coping with firm relocation?
Firm relocations out of the CBD have triggered an identity crisis that mirrors the larger South
African project of redefining itself in a post-apartheid context. Though the firm flight in some
ways dodged (or delayed) the conversation on racial integration and social co-existence, it also
left behind a contestable and symbolic space in the CBD. Contestations over the CBD are
emotionally charged, politically important, and highly publicized. Informal traders, business
owners, and government officials engage daily in battles over the rights to the streets.
A large proportion of the current CBD residents (and/or squatters) are immigrants-
many of them engaged in informal trading. They compete with South African traders for space
on the streets, often attracting xenophobic charges by locals). There is a large homeless
population that has moved into the CBD. The major banking and mining institutions are still
located in fortress-type buildings in the CBD. Their amenities are all within their monolith
structures, so that employees can avoid taking to the streets for food and leisure. The provincial
government has (generously) located in the CBD. Finally, the courts and library continue to
occupy space in the civic centre.
In many ways, the firm relocations opened up the space for this identity battle, but on a
very limited-perhaps manageable-scale. The space of the CBD is certainly easier for
politicians to revitalize than to tackle all of Soweto, or some of the more challenging townships.
This is not to say that the identity crisis is one that is easily revolved. The stakeholders
named have vastly different interests. Should the city strive for "world city" status (CDE, 2003)?
Should the city strive to be a "world class African city that works" (Interview C, 6 Jan 03)? Or
should the city make redistribution its sole goal and focus on rolling out services and education
to the poor?
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The solution is not clear-cut.. .Those that run the city want to improve the public
environment-the streets, pavements, parks, taxi areas, etc.-to attract business
and want to renew Johannesburg to reverse its overall decline. The marginalized
poor want cheap accommodation, jobs, and better welfare support. They do not
want to move to the peripheries of Johannesburg and into sprawling shack
settlements that are far from economic opportunities. They want to stay in the
city center (Emdon, in Tomlinson et al., 2003: 229).
This struggle seems to articulate, on a micro-scale, what should be a much larger project of
civic identity building.
What has been interesting in following the city's visioning for itself is the process by
which they do it. I was struck by the degree to which global rhetorics influenced their visions.
For example, the invocations of "world city" or a "world class city" are repeated throughout the
various planning documents (CDE, 2003; Joburg 2030, 2002; CJP, 2003). The Joburg 2030
document, which outlines the city's long-term planning vision, refers to the importance of
exploiting both economies of urbanization and economies of localization.
Outside of the official planning documents, plans for urban renewal and revitalization are
drawing largely on the experience of U.S. cities. When I was conducting my interviews in
January, I was amazed by the number of people who quoted to me from Rudy Giuliani's recent
book, Leadership. Giuliani's mayoral tenure is held by nearly all (save one) of the people I
spoke with as being an ideal approach to turning a city around, especially concerning "crime
and grime." They were sincerely surprised to hear that Giuliani's popularity among New Yorkers
was lukewarm at best.
Finally, many of the approaches being adopted by organizations like the Central
Johannesburg Partnership (inner city renewal leaders) and the Johannesburg Development
Agency (the city's redevelopment authority) are taken directly from U.S. models. The director of
the CJP, for example, recounted all of the trips he had made to U.S. cities, and all of the U.S.
mayors and city officials he had hosted in Johannesburg to demonstrate the degree to which he
pulls from international best-practice models of urban revitalization. Public-private partnerships
have been an especially popular model in Johannesburg. These partnerships are exemplified
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by projects like Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), which develop partnerships to put extra
security guards on the street and hire extra cleaning crews. The CBD's new surveillance
system (CCTV), which installs cameras on most street corners in the inner city and monitors
criminal activity (or, they remind me, non-functioning traffic lights, broken water mains, or car
accidents), began as a private-public partnership. It has subsequently spun off as an entirely
private entity that is contracted by the government.
These city-driven responses to "crime and grime" have been unquestionably successful.
However, when I asked the director of the CCTV program whether there had been any concerns
raised about civil liberties and privacy, he said, "Look, people aren't thinking about their
privacy-they're too worried about getting mugged" (Business Against Crime, 2003).
The shift towards public-private partnerships is perhaps understandable in the context of
the city of Johannesburg's fiscal crisis, and near bankruptcy. This crisis clearly illustrated the
inability of government to "go it alone." The private sector participation in these arguably public
roles, then, emerged more out of necessity and desperation than a real conviction that
partnerships are effective tools for service provision, capital projects, and urban development.
Nonetheless, the way in which public-private partnerships have emerged questions the
degree to which global models can be applied to different contexts. The key question is
whether cities are engaged in institutional learning, whereby they borrow models and fit them to
local contexts, or rather implementing best practices, where they import U.S. models of urban
revitalization wholesale. The trend currently seems to be towards the latter. Given the myriad
differences between a city like New York and a city like Johannesburg (huge informal trading,
massive crime, polarized citizenry, decayed inner city), it seems like the techniques being used
in the name of urban renewal are at best optimistic.
Rethinking urban form in Johannesburg
What does the new economic geography in Johannesburg say about the city's urban form? As
long as land remains abundantly available and densities low, Johannesburg's urban form will
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remain dynamic. Firms now in the northern suburbs can afford to be "footloose" given the
mobility of their car-owning customers. However, they are unlikely to stray far from the northern
suburbs. In this respect, the economic landscape will not likely change, aside from increasing
traffic jams. Since Johannesburg has one tax base for the entire metropolitan area, intra-urban
relocation does not pose a threat in terms of state revenue collection.
What will become of the CBD? Given the cheap land still available in the northern
suburbs, it seems highly unlikely that formal business appealing to a wealthier clientele (of the
type that was in the CBD before) will return. It seems plausible that the CBD will become a
launch pad-both for informal traders and for small enterprises-to ultimately move their
businesses to the northern suburbs, where the wealthier customers reside. The low rental
prices in the CBD will only appeal to the type of entrepreneur that is either involved in mid- to
low-end retail, or office functions that employ medium-skilled people with low- to middle-income
customers. This trend has already begun, with Black-owned small enterprises creeping up in
some of the C- and D-grade office space (Rogerson and Rogerson, 1997b, in Beall et al., 2002).
Larger opportunities exist in functions like back-end (lower-skilled) office work like call centers,
or export-oriented, low-technology production. An example is the proposed fashion district
(Rogerson, Tomlinson, 1999). This area aims to coordinate the mass of informal traders that
currently sell clothing to international traders from Zimbabwe, Mozambique, and other African
countries. This seems like a viable project. However, it will have to produce clothing cheaply
enough to out-compete the informal traders that likely come up in their stead.
In short, claims that businesses will return to the CBD (Interview G, 29 Jan 03) are
unrealistic. The formal businesses once located in the CBD have moved, with their client base,
to the northern suburbs.
What should become of the CBD?
The contestations over the CBD reflect the important, and until now secondary, conversation
waiting to be had between races and classes about South Africa's economic future. There is a
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process underway of urban renewal-which could give Johannesburg a chance to revise its
image of itself in a way that is different, appropriately, from the past.
Rather than ignoring the new image of the CBD that is emerging, policy makers and city
advocates should embrace it. Although the flight of business out of the CBD has had negative
affects on the perception of the inner city, there is now an opportunity to recast the image in a
new way. Why would policy makers want to create the city in its old image? Its old image was
one of exploitation and segregation. There is now a chance, in their rhetoric, to build an African
city that works.
What is this new image? In the CBD, street traders and informal traders need to be
given far more latitude than the government currently provides. The reality is that
unemployment rates in Johannesburg continue to be staggering. The informal sector is often
the only plausible livelihood for many people. The government's current approach is to provide
organized markets for traders, and to rent kiosks on the sidewalks for trading. This certainly
organizes the trading, but also (in addition to the strict new bylaws that define allowable
distances one can trade from fire hydrants, street crossings, driveways, etc.) limits the number
of traders who can make a living.
More of an effort can be made to organize cottage industries out of the networks of
informal traders. I was told that the main barrier to this is not an unwillingness on the part of
traders to cooperate, but rather, a lack of capital to get such industries started. Finding this
capital will be a key challenge for the JDA and the city.
Finally, mixed-use development should become a top priority for city government. The
apartheid planning regime mandated not only racial segregation, but functional segregation. As
one property developer told me, "In South Africa, it was demarcated: you work here, you shop
there, you have entertainment elsewhere," (Interview D, 21 Jan 03). The CBD has historically
been just that-a central business district. Given the departure of business, it seems logical to
recast this zoned function. Business is undoubtedly important-not least because the built
121
environment supports it. However, as it stands, many of these buildings have already been
invaded by squatters living in overcrowded, unsanitary conditions. Given the housing shortage
in the city, and the vacancy of offices, the government should work to raise funds for
transforming these buildings into housing.
This call for mixed-use development is one that extends out of the CBD to the entire city.
It seems the best way forward is very quickly to begin promoting business development in the
areas where it was historically prohibited: black, coloured and Indian townships. If
businesses-both retail and office space could be established in and around some of these
areas it would open up job opportunities and bring labor closer to homes, thereby cutting down
on traffic congestion.
Many cities throughout the world have abandoned their dependence on a single urban
core. Though the tone of this thesis has tended to lament the flight of business out of the CBD,
this should not necessarily dictate the tone of future visions for the area. In the northern
suburbs, there is now a clear poly-nucleated form. Perhaps Johannesburg should embrace its
decentralized form. The key is to establish other nuclei in historically underserved areas of the
city. Business and retail centers (beyond merely a shopping mall) should be targeted for
development in the southern parts of the city. The Group Areas Act prohibited non-whites from
conducting business outside of prescribed areas of the city. Commerce in anything besides
essential goods could not be conducted in townships. The current government should actively
reverse these retrogressive policies.
This sort of policy recommendation demands that the government reorient its focus from
the microcosm of the CBD to the city at large. It advocates for spatial rather than sectoral
development. Businesses should be encouraged in and around residential hubs. Developing
sectoral nodes (i.e. of high-tech, financial and business services) should be secondary to
supporting businesses that tap the existing (rather than forecast) skills of the population.
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Concluding remarks
I do not purport to solve any of these problems for the city of Johannesburg. Rather, I present
some data on the intra-urban movement of businesses (and jobs). By analyzing the reasons for
their flight, and the patterns of their relocation, I have tried to tell a story of how firms make
location decisions. I have proposed this story as an alternative to some of the existing
narratives. Finally, I have offered some modest suggestions for how we can use of knowledge
of why firms locate where they do to shape these movements.
My overarching argument is a simple one. History matters for urban economic
development. The political transition in South Africa opened up a unique set of circumstances
that fundamentally altered expected patterns of economic development. The circumstances of
political transition offer a new challenge for developing a broader understanding of economic
geography-one that maintains enough flexibility to incorporate history.
In this paper, I developed a model for considering firm relocation. I argue that firms will
relocate if there is some combination of economic volatility, insecure surroundings, poor
government polices and institutions, and weak gains from being in proximity to other firms.
Understanding the micro-level effects of the economy, security, the state, and local firm
presence gives key clues as to whether a certain location will both attract and anchor
businesses. These four factors are key not only to growing local economies, but to maintaining
them as well.
123

Sources
African National Congress. "Opposition parties in a democratic South Africa." ANC Policy
Paper. Viewed online at http://www.anc.orq.za/ancdocs/pubs/umrabulo/umrabulol 3i.html, 20
Apr 2003.
Amsden, Alice. The Rise of the Rest: Challenges to the West from Late-Industrializing
Economies. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Beall, Jo, Owen Crankshaw and Susan Parnell. Uniting A Divided City: Governance and
Exclusion in Johannesburg. London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd, 2002.
Beauregard, Robert A. Voices of Decline: The Post-War Fate of U.S. Cities. New York:
Routledge, 2003.
Beavon, K. "Johannesburg: A city and metropolitan area in transformation." In C. Rakodi (ed.),
The Urban Challenge in Africa: Growth and Management of its Large Cities. Tokyo: United
Nations University, 1997, pp. 150-192. Available online at
http://www.unu.edu/unupress/unupbooks/uu26ue/uu26ue0g.htm.
Beavon, K. "Johannesburg: Coming to Grips with Globalization from an Abnormal Base." From
Fu-Chen Lo and Yue-Mon Ching (eds.). Globalization and the World of Large Cities. United
Nations Press, 1998.
Beavon, K. "Northern Johannesburg: Part of the 'Rainbow' or Neo-Apartheid City in the
Making?" Mots Pluriels. No. 13, April 2000. Viewed online at
http://www.arts.uwa.edu.au/MotsPluriels/MP1 300kb.html.
Bekker, Simon and Richard Humphries. From Control to Confusion: The Changing role
Adminitration Boards in South Africa, 1971-1983. Grahamstown, South Africa: Institute of
Social and Economic Research, 1985.
Bourguignon, Francois. "Crime, Violence and Inequitable Development." Paper prepared for
the Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics, Washington, DC, 28-30 Apr
1999.
Brouwer, A.E., I. Mariotti, and J.N. van Ommeren. "The firm relocation decision: a logit model."
Paper presented at the 42e ERSA Congress in Dortmund, Germany, August 2002.
Brunetti, A., G. Kisunko, and B. Weder. "Institutional Obstacles for Doing Business: Data
Description and Methodology of a Worldwide Private Sector Survey."
Cameron, G.C. and B.D. Clark. "Industrial Movement and the Regional Problem." University of
Glasgow Social and Economic Studies, Occasional Paper No. 5. Edinburgh: Oliver & Boyd,
1966.
125
"Constraints to Growth and Employment in South Africa: Report #1: Statistics from the Large
Manufacturing Firm Survey." GJMC-World Bank Partnership. August, 2000. Viewed online at:
http://www.tips.org.za/research/Ifs/Ifs.pdf, 18 Oct 2002.
Crotty, Ann, "For crime and the JSE, read crime on the JSE," Business Report, 4 Nov 98.
Emdon, Erica. "Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Area." 1999. Available online at
htt:www.local. gov. za/DCD/policydocs/wh itepaper/further/frchP, 22 Nov 2002.
Erickson, Rodney A. and Michael Wasylenko. "Firm Relocation and Site Selection in Suburban
Municipalities." Journal of Urban Economics. Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 69-85, 1980.
Fanaroff, Dr. B. L. "Resolve Crime and Security Solutions." Safety and Security Report for the
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council. May 2002.
"Fear of Crime." Monograph 24: Environmental Design for Safer Communities. Pretoria:
Institute for Security Studies, 1998.
Fine, Ben. "Industrial Policy and South Africa: A Strategic View." NIEP Occasional Paper
Series, No. 5, April 1997.
Fishman, Robert. Bourgeois Utopias: The Rise and Fall of Suburbia. New York: Basic Books,Inc., Publishers, 1987.
Garwood, J.D. "An Analysis of Post-War Industrial Migration to Utah and Colorado." Economic
Geography. Vol. 29, No. 1, pp. 79-88.
Goga, Soraya. "Property Investors and Decentralization: A case of false competition?" In
Emerging Johannesburg. Edited by Tomlinson, Beauregard, Bremner, and Mangcu. New York:
Routledge, 2003.
Harvey, David. The Condition of Postmodernity. London: Blackwell, 1990.
Harvey, David. The Urbanization of Capital. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1985.
"Introduction: Section 6, Leases." The Gaffney Group. Viewed online at
http://www.gaffney.co.za/introduction6 10.html, 20 Apr 2003.
"Joburg 2030." City of Johannesburg's Economic Development Plan. Compiled by the City of
Johannesburg's Corporate Planning Unit. Johannesburg: City of Johannesburg, 2002.
"Johannesburg: Africa's World City." Research report by The Centre for Development and
Enterprise (CDE). Johannesburg: CDE, Oct 2002.
Kain, John F. "Housing Segregation, Negro Employment, and Metropolitan Decentralization."
The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Vol. 82, No. 2, 175-197, May 1968.
Keeble, D. "Industrial Decentralization and the Metropolis: the north-west London case."
Transactions, Association of British Geographers. Vol. 44, pp. 1-54.
126
Krugman, Paul. "Increasing Returns and Economic Geography." Journal of Political Economy.
Vol. 99, No. 3,1991.
Krugman, Paul and Anthony Venables. "Globalization and the Inequality of Nations." NBER
Working Paper 5098. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc., 1995.
Krumme, G. "Towards a Geography of Enterprise." Economic Geography. No. 45, pp. 30-40,
1969.
Lipman, Alan and Howard Harris. "Fortress Johannesburg." Paper prepared for Urban Futures
Conference, an international conference at the University of Witwatersrand from 20-23 June
2000, Johannesburg, South Africa. Available online at:
http://www.wits.ac.za/fac/arts/urbanf/papers/lipman.htm.
Lobo, Jose. "Regional Science and the 'New' Economic Geography: Complements or
Substitutes?" Cornell University. PPT presentation, viewed online at
http://www.crp.cornell.edu/home/rs/multimedia/iose presentation.pdf, 24 Mar 2003.
Louw, Antoinette, Mark Shaw, Lala Camerer, Rory Robertshaw. "Crime in Johannesburg."
Monograph No. 18. Pretoria: Institute of Security Studies, 1998a.
Louw, Antoinette, Mark Shaw, Lala Camerer, Rory Robertshaw. "Crime City: An International
Perspective on Johannesburg." Crime & Conflict. No. 11, Autumn 1998b.
Luiz, Prof. John. "Johannesburg Inner City Performance Indicators." School of Economics and
Business Sciences. University of Witwatersrand. May 2002.
Luttrell, W.F. Factory Location and Industrial Movement: a study of recent experience in Great
Britain. Volume 1 & 2. London: National Institute of Economic and Social Research, 1962.
Mandy, Nigel. A City Divided: Johannesburg & Soweto. Johannesburg: Macmillan South
Africa (Pty) Ltd, 1984.
"Map of Murder Incidence in the Greater Johannesburg Area: Murders per 1000 people."
CEROI: Cities Environmental Reports on the Internet: Johannesburg, South Africa. 2000.
Available online at:
http://ceroi.net/reports/johannesburg/csoe/images/envissues/poverty/maps/crime%20murder.ipq
, 8 Dec 2002.
Marais, Hein. South Africa: Limits to Change. London: Zed Books, 2001.
McLaughlin, G.E. and S. Robock. Why Industry Moves South: a study of factors influencing the
recent location of manufacturinq plants in the South. Kingsport, Tennessee: Kingsport Press,
National Planning Association, 1949.
Mieszkowski, Peter and Edwin S. Mills. "The Causes of Metropolitan Suburbanization." The
Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol. 7, No. 3,135-147, Summer 1993.
Mkwanazi, Mafika, Karen Bala, and Sipho Mashinini. Transnet. Interviewed by Graeme Gotz.
4 Nov 2002.
127
Monitor. "Resolve crime and security solutions: Safety and security sector report for the
Greater Johannesburg Metropolitan Council." Unpublished report prepared for the iGoli2010
Partnership. (Provided by Rashid Seedat, Director, Corporate Planning Unit, City of
Johannesburg.) Boston: Monitor Company, 2000.
Morgan, Kevin. "The Learning Region: Institutions, Innovation and Regional Renewal."
Regional Studies. Vol. 31, No. 5: pp. 491-503, 1997.
Morris, Alan. Bleakness & Light: Inner-City Transition in Hillbrow, Johannesburg.
Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1999.
Mueller, E. Location Decisions and Industrial Mobility in Michigan. Ann Arbor, MI: University of
Michigan, 1961.
Musiker, Naomi and Reuben Musiker. Historical Dictionary of Greater Johannesburg. Lanham,
Maryland, and Oxford: The Scarecrow Press, Inc., 1999.
"New Perspectives on Urbanisation." Supplement to South African Digest, July 11, 1986.
Bureau for Information, Pretoria, South Africa. Printed by CTP Web, Johannesburg, on behalf
of the Government Printer, Pretoria.
"Newly Released Crime Statistics." South African Police Service: Crime Information Analysis
Centre, 2000. Viewed online at http://www.saps.orq.za/8 crimeinfo/bulletin/index.htm, 15 Feb
2003.
Parnell, Susan, Edgar Pieterse, Mark Swilling, and Dominique Wooldridge (editors).
Democratising Local Government: The South African Experiment. Cape Town: University of
Cape Town Press, 2002.
Pellenbarg, P.H., L.J.G. van Wissen, J. van Dijk. "Firm Relocation: State of the Art and
Research Prospects." No. 02D31 in Research Report from University of Groningen, Research
Institute SOM (Systems, Organisations and Management). 2002.
"Phonebook: Johannesburg." July 2002-2003. Compiled by Telkom Directory Services (Pty)
Ltd. Printed by Universal Web Printers, Springfield Park Durban for Telkom SA Limited.
Polenske, Karen. "Alternative Regional Growth and Location Theories." Lecture notes from
11.481J at MIT. 12 Feb 2002a.
Polenske, Karen. "Influence of Globalization on Factor Mobility." Lecture notes from 11.481J at
MIT. 26 Feb 2002b.
Polenske, Karen. "Networks & Self-Organization." Lecture notes from 11.481J at MIT. 14 Feb
2002c.
Porter, Michael. "Regions and the New Economics of Competition." Global City-Regions.
Edited by Allen J. Scott. New York: Oxford University Press, 2001.
128
Prinsloo, Dirk. Report on the future development potential of the office component in Sandton.
Circa 1982. Private report given to me by Prinsloo, an urban economist at Urban Studies,
Johannesburg, South Africa, 14 May 2003.
Rauch, James. "Does History Matter Only When It Matters Little? The Case of City-Industry
Location." The Quarterly Journal of Economics. Aug 1993.
Richardson, Harry W. and Peter Gordon. "Is Sprawl Inevitable? Lessons from Abroad." Paper
presented at the ACSP Conference, Chicago, November 1999.
Rogerson, C. and Hart, D. "The Struggle for the Streets: Deregulation and hawking in South
Africa's major urban areas." Social Dynamics,15, pp. 29-45.
Rogerson, C. M. and Rogerson, J. M. "The Changing Post-Apartheid City: Emergent Black-
Owned Small Enterprises in Johannesburg." Urban Studies. Vol. 34, No. 1, 85-103, 1997.
SAPS, Crime Information Analysis Centre, viewed online at
http://www.saps.org.za/8 crimeinfo/bulletin/index.htm, 15 Apr 2003.
Shevel, Adele and Thabo Leshilo. "Johannesburg Exodus Continues." Business Report. 11-
25-98.
"South Africa, Lesotho, & Swaziland," Lonely Planet. Oakland, CA: Lonely Planet Publications
(Pty) Ltd, 2002.
Spinks, Charlotte. "A New Apartheid? Urban Spatiality, (Fear of) Crime, and Segregation in
Cape Town, South Africa." Development Studies Institute (DESTIN) Working Paper Series.
No. 01-20. London School of Economics, Sept 2001.
Storper, Michael and Richard Walker. The Capitalist Imperative: Territory, Technology, and
Industrial Growth. Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1989, pp. 70-124.
Tomlinson, Richard and Chris Rogerson. "An Economic Development Strategy for the
Johannesburg Inner City." Strategy prepared as part of the UMP City Consultation Process on
behalf of the Inner City Section 59 Committee, 12 Apr 1999.
Tomlinson, Richard, Robert A. Bureaugard, Lindsay Bremner, and Xolela Mangcu. Emerging
Johannesburg: Perspectives on the Postapartheid City. New York: Routledge, 2003.
Townroe, P.M. "Some behavioral considerations in the industrial location decision." Regional
Studies. Vol. 6, pp. 261-272.
Van Long, Ngo and Antoine Soubeyran. "R&D Spillovers and Location Choice under Cournot
Rivalry."
Victor, Rodney. 'We take the wraps off crime spree." The Star. 10 Jun 1997. Viewed online at
http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set id=1&click id=79&art id=arch14933be561f8e597c, 4 Apr
2003.
129
Wasylenko, Michael J. "Evidence of Fiscal Differentials and Intrametropolitan Firm Relocation."
Land Economics. Vol. 56, No. 3, August 1980.
Watkins, Thayer. "Urban Economics." Course syllabus and description for Econ 166, San Jose
State University. Viewed online at http://www.sisu.edu/faculty/watkins/el 66q.htm, 3.24.03.
'Witwatersrand." MapStudio Street Guide. 12th Edition, 2002. CTP Book Printers.
130
Interviews
(Note: Names have been omitted to protect the confidentiality of the interviews.)
Name Title Organization Date
Interview A Professor, Dept of University of Pretoria 1.30.03
Geography
Interview B Professor, Dept of University of Witwatersrand 1.23.03
Architecture
Interview C Executive Director Central Johannesburg 1.6-7.03
Partnership
Interview D Managing Director Dijalo Property Services (Pty) 1.21.03
Ltd
Interview E CEO Apex Hi Properties 1.13.03
Interview F Director Standard Bank Properties 1.9.03
Interview G Mayor City of Johannesburg 1.29.03
Interview H Chief Srategic Officer Blue IQ 1.14.03
Interview I Operations Manager Fidelity Security 1.24.03
Interview J Development Urban-Econ 1.10.03
Economist
Interview K Station Commissioner South African Police Service 1.24.03
Interview L Station Commissioner South African Police Service 1.21.03
Interview M Station Commissioner South African Police Service 1.20.03
Interview N Johannesburg Area South African Police Service 1.30.03
Commissioner
Interview 0 Professor / Consultant Independent 1.30.03
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Telephone Survey Respondents
(All interviews conducted in March and April 2003)
Firm CBD Location Current Location
Dorbyl Ltd Financial District: Barclay Houghton
House
Link Insurance Brokers (Pty) Financial District: New Glenvista
Ltd Plaza Centre
Loop & Needlecrafts (Pty) Ltd Financial District: Fanora Braamfontein
House
National Business Initiative Financial District: Union Auckland Park
Centre
NP Shipping Services Financial District: Montrose Houghton Estates
House
Brugman Inc. Carlton Centre Same
Levisons Stores (Pty) Ltd Carlton Centre Same
SA Tour Carlton Centre --
Sage Properties Ltd North State Building same
Alfnet Manufacturing Jewelers Quebec House La Rochelle
Gerald Carson & Associates Landmark House Hyde Park
Gold Coin Exchange Carlton Centre Sandton
Helm SA (Pty) Ltd Carlton Centre Bedfordview
Gerald Horwitz Attorney Century Insurance Building Houghton
Letcor Property Management Kine Centre Braamfontein
Nonyongo & Associates York House Braamfontein
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Appendix A
Data Collection Methodology
For this study of firm relocations in Johannesburg, I sought two sets of data. First, I needed to
know which firms were located in the Johannesburg in the CBD in the 1980s and 1990s.
Second, I needed to know where these firms went.
During my research trip to Johannesburg, I learned that there is no existing dataset that
monitors the movement of firms out of the city's CBD. On the advice of an employee at the
Johannesburg City of Commerce, I used the Braby's Directory of Johannesburg businesses.
This is the only source that categorizes firms by geography, rather than function." Moreover,
Braby's Directory listed firms in the CBD according to their building. I was thus able to
determine which buildings housed which firms at a given point in time.
I borrowed the Braby's Directories for 1986-7 and 1996-7 from the Johannesburg Public Library.
To narrow the scope of the study, I chose two of the six precincts that comprise the CBD: the
Financial District and the Commercial District, (see Table A.1). My choice of these two districts
was not random. Through the course of my interviews and readings, these two districts
emerged as interesting study cases. Both districts were among the strongest economic
performers during the apartheid era. The Financial District was the seat of several of the city's
major banking outfits, and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The Commercial District was the
retail center of Johannesburg, flanked by the prestigious Carlton Hotel and shopping centre.
Table A.1: Inner City Office Districts
District Area
Exchange Bree and Pim Streets to the north, Rissik Street to the east and Market Street to
the south, with Goch Street forming the western boundary
Financial Market Street to the north, Rissik Street to the east, Hall Street and Village Road
to the south, and the M1 to the west
Commercial Bree Street to the north, Albert Street to the south, Delvers and Goud Streets in
the east, with Von Brandis Street forming its western boundary
Midtown Bree Street in the north, Albert Street in the south, Von Brandis Street in the east
and Rissik Street to the west
Station Noord Street and Park Station in the north, Harrison Street in the west, Nugget
Street in the east and Bree Street forming its southern boundary
Braamfontein Railway line to the south, Hospital Street to the east, the Braamfontein Ridge to
the north and the M1 motorway to the west
Source: AMPROS; cited in Tomlinson & Rogerson, 1999: 36.
1 Due to the unavailability of data of firm movements, I was unable to determine the year that each firm
left the CBD.
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The importance of these two districts is demonstrated by its high proportion of A-grade office
space, (See Table A.2). With the exception of Braamfontein (whose inclusion in definitions of
the CBD has been historically inconsistent, and therefore was excluded from this study), the
Financial and Commercial districts have the highest levels of A- and B-grade office space and
the highest levels of total office space.
Table A.2: Office Area in Each District (M2
Grade Exchange Financial Commercial Midtown Station Braamfontein
A 242588 391622 287667 34680 5635 261260
B 116541 275143 120067 115479 80586 177843
C 54513 271135 114645 264116 164172 282207
D 46115 34100 156642 69597 80798 88122
Total 459 757 972 000 679 021 483 872 331 191 809 432
% A & 75 65 60 31 26 54
B I I I II_ I
Source: AMPROS; cited in Tomlinson & Rogerson, 1999: 34.
I used the map in Figure 1.3 to determine which addresses in Braby's Directory fell within the
boundaries of the Commercial and Financial Districts. As an example, in 1986, there were 2463
firms in the Commercial District's buildings. I used the firm names listed in Braby's to look up
the firm in the current Phonebook: Johannesburg (2003). If the firm was listed in the current
phonebook, I noted its current address. For the 1986 Commercial District firms, I found current
address listings for 539 of them, (or 22%).
I then categorized these addresses by their suburbs. When the suburb was ambiguous (i.e., if
only the street address was listed), I used MapStudids street map of Johannesburg to
determine in which suburb the firm was located. I used these suburb distinctions to map the
relocation patterns of firms in Johannesburg.
For the 1996-97 period, I slightly altered my methodology. Because there was such a
noticeable drop in the total number of firms in each CBD building, I aggregated the Financial
and Commercial Districts for this period.
My decision to analyze the Carlton Centre as opposed to other buildings was also a calculated
(rather than random) decision. As described in the text, the Carlton Centre has historically been
a powerful cultural symbol. Moreover, it is the largest office building in the CBD. By following
the movements of firms of firms specifically located in that building, I sought to determine
whether there was any direct parallel between CBD location and new location.
Problems with the Data
Despite my efforts to collect this address-information precisely, the data are fraught with
problems. First, the listings in Braby's Directory are imperfect. I was warned about the
problems of reliability inherent in using this source. A woman from the Johannesburg Chamber
of Commerce told me that the 1980s versions were fairly reliable, but that their reputation had
declined since then. This was evident in their listings. Many of the CBD buildings had firm
names repeated or cut off. There was a fair measure of guesswork involved on my part when
firm names were incomplete. Similarly, when I looked up firm names in the current phonebook,
I occasionally had to interpret whether similar-sounding businesses were indeed the same.
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Often there was no problem deducing whether the same firm I found listed in the 1986
Braby's Directory, for example, was the same firm I looked up in the Phonebook: Johannesburg.
However, there were many instances in which it was not so clear.
This is not to suggest that the data are therefore totally invalid. Rather, they should be
understood to highlight general trends rather than precise events.
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Appendix B
Survey Methodology
I conducted a telephone survey of a random sample of firms from my dataset in order to hear
from firms directly about the reasons for their relocation.
I used the statistical software package, SPSS, to randomly select firms out of my datasets. I
originally selected about 60 firms. However, due to the limitations of a telephone survey
(unwilling respondents, wrong numbers, inability to reach the appropriate person, faulty data), I
was only able to conduct full surveys with 16 of these firms. The expense of international
calling, the lack of time, and the difficulty with time zones, prohibited me from expanding this
phone survey any further.
Additionally, I was asking firm employees about their locational decisions 20 years ago in some
cases. Respondents unsurprisingly did not always remember the specifics of their decision (i.e.
which estate agent helped them relocate). More often, the respondents were not employed by
the company when they relocated.
For these reasons, this survey (like the data collection) is not necessarily reliable. However, the
survey responses give texture to the personal response of firms and employees to the
exogenous changes around transition. They give voice to the trends that we witness
happening. As such, I contend that they are an important (if imperfect) source.
Appendix C is a sample survey for firms that left the CBD. Appendix D is a sample survey for
firms that stayed in the CBD. Appendix z summarizes the respondents' answers to the survey.
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Appendix C
Telephone Questionnaire: Firms that stayed in the CBD
Questionnaire
Introduction:
I am conducting a survey of firms that have relocated out of the CBD. Your firm was randomly selected
from a sample of approximately 800 firms that have relocated over the past fifteen years. Through this
survey, I seek to understand why firms locate where they do. This survey comprises a key part of my
Masters thesis on firm relocation in Johannesburg. Please note that all information supplied will be
kept confidential at your request.
Directions: Please fill out the following as completely as possible.
Demographics
Business Name:
Age of Business:
Number of employees at current location:
Sector Classification:
Nature of business:
Is your firm South African-owned?
Is your firm's primary market local, provincial, national, or global?
Decision to stay in the CBD
How many years has your firm been in the CBD?
To what degree has crime in the CBD affected your firm and employees: Not at all; somewhat;
significantly; or it was the primary factor. (Please indicate)
Please briefly summarize why your firm stayed in the CBD.
Do any of the following factors influence your decision to stay in the CBD: proximity to similar
firms, proximity to clients/customers, or proximity to employees? (Please indicate.)
Does your firm conduct any R&D?
Who owns your building in the CBD?
Thank you for completing this survey. If you would like to see the results of this survey,
please note it below.
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Appendix D
Telephone Survey Questionnaire: Firms that relocated
outside the CBD
Questionnaire
Introduction:
I am conducting a survey of firms that have relocated out of the CBD. Your firm was randomly selected from a sample of
approximately 800 firms that have relocated over the past fifteen years. Through this survey, I seek to understand why firms locate
where they do. This survey comprises a key part of my Masters thesis on firm relocation in Johannesburg. Please note that all
information supplied will be kept confidential at your request.
Directions: Please fill out the following as completely as possible.
Demographics
Business Name:
Age of Business:
Number of employees at current location:
Sector Classification:
Nature of business:
Is your firm South African-owned?
Is your firm's primary market local, provincial, national, or global?
Relocation out of the CBD
In what year did your firm leave the CBD?
Please briefly summarize why your firm left the CBD.
Did any of the following factors motivate your relocation out of the CBD: growth, merger,
acquisition, or takeover? (Please indicate.)
To what degree did crime in the CBD affect your decision to relocate? Not at all; somewhat;
significantly; or it was the primary factor. (Please indicate)
Please briefly summarize why you chose your present location.
Did any of the following factors influence your choice of a new location: proximity to similar
firms, proximity to clients/customers, or proximity to employees? (Please indicate.)
Does your firm conduct any R&D?
Who owned your building in the CBD?
Who owns your current property?
Which property developer or realtor helped your company relocate?
141

Appendix E
Phone survey details (1)
Firm Former Current Age Employees Nature of South Market Year Reasons for leaving Was crime a Reasons for
location location at current business African- scope firm (or staying) factor? new location
location owned? left
CBD
Dorbyl Ltd Financial Houghton 100 12 Automotive Yes Global 1980 'The CBD was No Convenient to
District: years components and (with a becoming a bit run the north and
Barclay roof tresses division down." east.
House in the
U.S.)
Link Financial Glenvista 22 1 Insurance Yes Local 1986 Merged with business in No My boss
Insurance District: years brokerage Wadeville bought a
Brokers (Pty) New company
Ltd Plaza there.
Centre
Loop & Financial Braam- 27 36 Import distributor South National 1994 Crime in the CBD was Yes: it was The rent at
Needlecraft District: fontein years African very high. We've got a the primary that stage was
(Pty) Ltd Fanora and showroom and factor. quite
House German customers weren't reasonable.
prepared to come to the
CBD.
National Financial Auckland 14 60 Development Yes National 1995 We merged 2 Not at all. One of our
Business District: Park years agents; organizations, and our members gave
Initiative Union consultants CBD property wasn't us a
Centre large enough. discounted
rental.
NP Shipping Financial Houghton 30 5 Import-Export; Yes Local & 1983 We're a family business Not at all. Moved our
Services District: Estates years customs clearing provincial that works mostly from home.
Montrose home; we moved to a
House suburb and the business
came with us.
Brugman Inc. Carlton Same 25 25-30 Law firm Yes Local -- Everybody was leaving, It was-10 --
Centre years and we considered years ago. It's
going, but it was fine now.
convenient to be so
close to the courts. And
things have gotten
better-it's safe now.
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Firm Former Current Age Employees Nature of South Market Year Reasons for leaving Was crime a Reasons for
location location at current business African- scope firm (or staying) factor? new location
location owned? left
CBD
Levisons Carlton Same 50 5 Retail: clothing Yes Local -- Because of business. Yes-it was --
Stores (Pty) Centre years We had that hope of 'we terrible. Crime
Ltd can make it' (despite the has come
high crime). down since
the cameras
(were
installed).
SA Tour Carlton -- n/a n/a Tourism Yes Global 2000 We closed the office -- --
Centre completely.
Sage North same n/a 11 Property division Yes Local -- Really, we're only here Not
Properties Ltd State of an insurance because we own the chronically.
Building house building.
Alfnet Quebec La 12-13 5 Jewelry Yes Local 1997 Crime was a big Yes-a Shopping
Manufacturing House Rochelle years manufacturer problem-some of our significant centre, a lot
Jewelers customers were being factor. more people,
robbed. Hawkers and appropriate
cleanliness were real clientele, more
issues for us. upper class.
Gerald Landmark Hyde Park 46 n/a Law firm Yes n/a 1994 My clientele moved to Me personally, It's very nice;
Carson & House years Sandton. They felt it not at all; but it's half
Associates dangerous to enter the for my clients country, yet
CBD. it was the central to
primary factor. everything I
need; my
clients love
coming here.
Gold Coin Carlton Sandton 25 25 Sell Kruger Yes National 1996 Clients didn't want to Perception of To capture the
Exchange Centre years rands and gold come to the Carlton crime was a tourist market;
coins Centre anymore. problem; but we came to a
nothing tourist mecca.
happened to
our clients or
employees.
Helm SA (Pty) Carlton Bedford- 30 5 Distribution of No- Global 1998 It was unsafe. It was the It's a good
Ltd Centre view years chemicals, food, German primary factor. area. There's
and a shopping
pharmaceutical mall right next
door.
Gerald Century Houghton 25 4 Law firm Yes Some 1997 Security was the main It was the Mr. Horwitz
Horwitz Insurance years global, reason. primary factor. lives in the
Attorney Building but townhouse
mainly next door.
local
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Property rental
and fictional title
We left for Bryanston
because of the violence
itself; we found that our
clientele was based in
the CBD area, so then
we moved back to town.
It was about
60% of the
reason.
To be near our
clients.
Braamfontein
is quite safe.
We've had 1
or 2 small
problems, but
that's to be
expected.
Nonyongo & York Braam- 20 3 Law firm Yes Local 1998 The CBD was becoming Crime was It's quiet,
Associates House fontein years too dangerous. People one of the clean, safe,
were running down the most important properly
buildings; they were no reasons I left. policed.
longer clean or safe; my We had break-
clients were complaining ins almost
that they couldn't find monthly.
parking.
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Letcor
Property
Management
Kine
Centre
Braam-
fontein
14
years

Appendix F
Phone survey details (2)
Firm Former Current Who owned Who owns Which Did any of the following factors
location location your CBD current estate agent influence your relocation choice?
building? property? helped you Proximity to:
relocate? Similar Clients or Employees
firms Customers
Dorbyl Ltd Financial Houghton Don't know. Don't know. Don't know. X X X
District:
Barclay
House
Link Financial Glenvista Don't Don't Don't know.
Insurance District: remember. remember.
Brokers (Pty) New
Ltd Plaza
Centre
Loop & Financial Braamfontein Can't We do. Can't
Needlecrafts District: remember. remember.
(Pty) Ltd Fanora
House
National Financial Auckland PG Klaus Grey Don't know.
Business District: Park Properties
Initiative Union
Centre
NP Shipping Financial Houghton We did. We do. N/A X
Services District: Estates
Montrose
House
Brugman Inc. Carlton Same N/A N/A N/A X
Centre
Levisons Carlton Same N/A
Stores (Pty) Centre
Ltd I I I I 1 _ _ _1
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Firm Former Current Who owned Who owns Which Did any of the following factors
location location your CBD current estate agent influence your relocation choice?
building? property? helped you Proximity to:
relocate? Similar Clients or Employees
firms Customers
SA Tour Carlton -
Centre
Sage North same Sage Sage N/A
Properties Ltd State
Building
Alf net Quebec La Rochelle Don't 3 private Don't know. X
Manufacturing House remember. individuals.
Jewelers
Gerald Landmark Hyde Park Private RMB The estate X
Carson & House corporation; Properties agent has
Associates Principal (owned by now gone
shareholder First Rand out of
died; his son, a Bank Ltd) business.
barrister,
inherited most
of his shares.
Gold Coin Carlton Sandton Carlton Centre Liberty Don't know. X
Exchange Centre
Helm SA (Pty) Carlton Bedfordview Carlton Centre Liberty Don't know.
Ltd Centre
Gerald Century Houghton Don't know. N/A N/A X
Horwitz Insurance
Attorney Building
Letcor Kine Braamfontein Technicor Sabre We did it X
Property Centre Holdings ourselves.
Management I I I I- III
Nonyongo & York Braamfontein Old Mutual Anglo Broil X
Associates House American Properties I
148
